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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal novices face perplexing uncertainty as they enter the ca-
cophonous discourse community of law school, the entrance lobby
to the larger discourse community of practice. They do not under-
stand how to read legal texts, nor do they know the conventions of
analysis, argument, and agreement lawyers use in predicting, per-
suading, and drafting. They do not understand lawyers' pluralistic
purposes, the needs of their legal audiences, or the complex web of
overlapping and changing contexts which structure new opportu-
nities and constraints for each writing project. Given this lack of
understanding, novices naturally flounder during the unfamiliar
task of actually producing legal text, where uncertainties of com-
prehension, knowledge transformation, and rhetorical setting
combine to produce glutinous prose necessarily echoing old forms
and old purposes.
Legal writing specialists have begun to map the complexities
facing legal novices and to prescribe new pedagogies, which would
accelerate and intensify students' acculturation into the legal dis-
course community. Teresa Godwin Phelps was the first to propose
a "new rhetoric" which would transform students' appreciation of
the multivariate purposes and audiences of legal writers and in-
crease students' self-control of their writing processes as well as
their writing products.' Neil Feigenson joined Phelps' new rheto-
ric when he urged legal writing specialists to focus their pedagogy
not on the traditional texts lawyers produce but on the writer and
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on the writer's rhetorical assessments and purposes.2 Elizabeth Fa-
jans and Mary R. Falk revisited the new rhetoric and argued back-
wards that stronger writing was dependent on stronger reading,
and that legal novices must be taught more robust heuristics for in-
terpreting legal texts pluralistically and critically.3
Joseph Williams, Chris Rideout, and Jill Ramsfield further ex-
tended the new rhetoric project by focusing on a contextual and
social pedagogy - one emphasizing the social field and diverse in-
terpretive community of legal practitioners.4  Rideout and
Ramsfield, in particular, urged legal writers and legal writing spe-
cialists "to acknowledge the social contexts within which writing
takes place and, thus, to acknowledge the ways in which writing
generates meanings that are shaped and constrained by those con-
texts.""
More recently, a group of legal writing specialists has chal-
lenged the political and moral purposes of traditional legal rheto-
ric urging an even more critical interpretive stance towards legal
texts, legal discourse, and legal culture.6 They recognize that the
2. See Neil Feigenson, Essay Review: Legal Writing Texts Today, 41 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 503, 506 (1991).
3. See Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase:
Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 163, 164 (1993).
4. See J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised
View, 69 WASH. L. REv. 35, 56 (1994); Joseph Williams, On the Maturing of Legal
Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, IJ. LEGAL WRrrING INST. 1, 1 (1991).
5. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 4, at 57. "The social perspective, then,
moves beyond the traditional rhetorical concern for audience, forcing researchers
[and legal writing specialists] to consider issues such as social roles, group pur-
poses, communal organization, ideology, and finally theories of culture." Id. at
56-57 n.80 (quoting Lester Faigley, Nonacademic Writing: The Social Perspective, in
WRITING IN NONACADEMIC SETrINGS 231, 235-36 (Lee Odell & Dixie Goswamie eds.,
1985)).
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Britt et al., Extending the Boundaries of Rhetoric in Legal
Writing Pedagogy, 10J. Bus. & TECH. CoMM. 213, 223 (1996); Lorne Sossin, Dis-
course Politics: Legal Research and Writing's Search for a Pedagogy of Its Own, 29 NEw
ENG. L. REv. 883, 894 (1995) (advocating legal writing assignments designed to
challenge students to explore the politics of legal discourse); Deborah Schmede-
mann, Some Thoughts About Teaching Values in the Legal Writing Class, Panel Presen-
tation at the Legal Writing Institute (Aug. 1, 1992) (on file with the author);
Brook K. Baker, A Theory of Ecological Learning and Its Implications for Re-
search, Analysis and Writing Programs 89-92 (1995) [hereinafter, Baker, Implica-
tions for Research, Analysis and Writing Programs] (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author); Brook K. Baker, Connection and Expertise in the Workplace:
Finalizing a Theory of Ecological Learning, 106-25 (1994) [hereinafter, Baker,
Connection and Expertise in the Workplace] (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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legal discourse community is not only hard to enter, but that it is
also hard to leave - that fully acculturated practitioners have trou-
ble transcending the soothing conventions of their craft, the tradi-
tional professional repertoire. They emphasize that neither stu-
dents nor practitioners appreciate their role in developing law,
their critical moral authority to impact law's justice mission
through their writing.
Collectively, these colleagues advanced the project of discover-
ing a more complex pedagogy for legal writing specialists, one that
eases acculturation to existing practice at the same time that it
holds forth hope for a more critical, and more transformative prac-
tice. Although much has been accomplished, two questions re-
mained unasked and unanswered. First, what exactly are the lega-
cies of past literacy practices that confound students' process of
acculturation, and how can we build on and transcend the surface
traces of past projects and the deep structures and ideologies of
American literacy?7 Second, in addition to displaying critical con-
sciousness and utilizing critical interpretive strategies, what are the
critical writing strategies that address compelling issues of social jus-
tice?8 In exploring these two questions, I propose to look back into
7. Fajans, Falk and Joseph Williams address common problems in novices'
passive reading strategies. However, they offer little insight into the culture of lit-
eracy and the effects of schooling and how they affect the interpretive stances nov-
ices display toward authoritative texts. Williams for one seems to suggest that pas-
sive acceptance and paraphrase are unavoidable stages in the students'
acculturation into any new discourse community. See Williams, supra note 4, at 18-
23. Likewise, although Fajans and Falk discuss students' weak reading at length,
they do not diagnose those anemic strategies in terms of the overwhelming mo-
mentum of schooling practices which prime text-driven strategies. See Fajans &
Falk, supra note 3, at 166-90.
8. Sossin, for example, recommends a pedagogy which addresses the politics
of legal discourse and which uses more socially relevant subject matter for investi-
gation. See Sossin, supra note 6, at 897-901. She has failed, however, to consider
the additional step of articulating what a more critical discourse strategy might be.
Britt and her colleagues are more "political" than Sossin, because they propose
cultural awareness about "the roles of language in making knowledge and power;
interrelationships of institutions, knowledge, and power; the roles of popular cul-
ture and everyday practices in shaping and/or resisting dominant systems of
knowledge and power." Britt et al., supra note 6, at 218. Thus, Britt et al. recom-
mend a pedagogy that critically examines legal texts and the relationship between
community membership, language, and power. See id. at 231-34. But they, too,
offer little advice about transferring consciousness to a reformulated writing prac-
tice in law offices and judicial chambers.
Clinicians have had more time and more opportunity to consider the bene-
fits of a social justice mission in their teaching. See, e.g., Fran Quigley, Seizing the
Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law
[Vol. 23
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the recesses of students' reading and writing histories for the tacit
assumptions they bring to current tasks. I propose as well to look
forward, beyond the classroom, to the world of practice where
critical texts must be produced under grinding pressures of con-
formity, client-centeredness, and calcified reader expectations.
Fortunately, in addressing the first question concerning lega-
cies of literacy, the study of reading and writing practices has grown
increasingly sophisticated as researchers have devised ingenious
studies investigating the constructive processes involved in reading
and writing, especially during periods of transition.9 Composition
researchers have studied reading-to-write practices in a number of
transitional contexts, most particularly college writing programs.
These researchers emphasize that reading and writing are active
cognitive processes that deploy well-established routines of mean-
ing-making but which are constrained both by the immediate rhe-
torical setting and by the larger cultural matrix of ideology and lit-
eracy practices one inherits.'0 In addition to highlighting the
unfamiliar contextual constraints in a novel discourse community,
these researchers emphasize that readers/writers-in-transition must
devise their own goals and purposes to motivate and shape their in-
terpretation and production of text." In doing so, they are both
enabled and burdened by exemplars of past practice, exemplars
which confuse their conceptions of new literacy contexts and pur-
poses.
Because local setting, cultural context, rhetorical purpose, and
highly stylized discourse conventions are even more unfamiliar and
opaque during entry into a professionalized social practice domain
like the law, the transition to the legal discipline is particularly on-
erous. The standard, and largely subconscious, repertoire of cog-
School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37 (1995). Nonetheless, clinicians also struggle
over whether to present an "invitation" to consider social justice issues or whether
the purpose of their pedagogy should be frankly transformative. See id. at 3944.
9. See, e.g., LINDA FLOWER ET AL., READING-TO-WRITE: EXPLORING A COGNrrIVE
AND SOCIAL PROCESS (1990) [hereinafter READING-TO-WRITE].
10. See Linda Flower, Introduction: Studying Cognition in Context, in READING-
TO-WRTE, supra note 9, at 3, 12-14.
11. See Linda Flower, The Role of Task Representation in Reading-To-Write, in
READING-To-WRrrE, supra note 9, at 35, 50-53.
12. See Williams, supra note 4, at 14-16. I do not mean to suggest that prob-
lems during periods of transition are entirely cognitive. The first year of law
school can be a period of numbing isolation, plummeting self-esteem, and intense
alienation. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & James J. Conley, The Alienation of Law
Students, 75 MICH. L. REv. 887, 889-98 (1977) (surveying law student levels of al-
ienation, dissatisfaction, and sociability); Faith Dickerson, Psychological Counseling
5
Baker: Transcending Legacies of Literacy and Transforming the Traditiona
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAWREVIEW
nitive practices, reading techniques, and writing strategies students
have relied on successfully in the past are frequently ill-adapted to
the specialized demands of more purposeful discourse communi-
ties like legal practice. Even worse, the purposes and contexts of
legal writing are unusually pluralistic and conflicted given contra-
dictions between the interests of client and community, 13 between
the moral agency of lawyers and of those they represent, 4 and be-
tween law as given - that which protects the existing social order -
and law as it might be - that which expresses our aspirations for so-
cial and legal justice.
To better understand the challenges of teaching new arrivals
to our discourse community, Part II of this Article outlines the typi-
cal transitional problems that novice lawyers face in developing the
for Law Students: One Law School's Experience, 37 J. LEGAL EDuc. 82 (1987) (compil-
ing a study of students who sought professional counseling provided by the law
school); B.A. Glesner, Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 CONN. L. REV. 627,
63541 (1991) (examining the impact of stress on the social behaviors of law stu-
dents and positing that the extreme pressure interferes with learning and encour-
ages counterproductive behaviors); Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It:
Tapping into the Informational Stream to Move from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARIZ. L.
REV. 667, 670-75 (1994) (focusing on the psychological distress caused by tradi-
tional legal teaching methods); Stephen B. Shanfield & G. Andrew H. Benjamin,
Psychiatric Distress in Law Students, 35J. LEGAL EDUc. 65, 69 (1985) (comparing lev-
els of stress in law school students with those in medical school); Alan A. Stone,
Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 398-405 (1971) (discussing the
psychological impact of the process of legal education); James B. Taylor, Law
School Stress and the "Dformation Professionelle," 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251, 253-61
(1975) (discussing the law school experience and its effects on students' social
and ethical values). Lack of context, incomprehensible teaching methods, de-
layed feedback, and interpersonal isolation can reduce previously competent
adults to an AC/DC state of severe depression and/or hot-wired anxiety. This
psychological infantilization is hard enough on majority students but is even more
difficult for students of color and other nontraditional students who suffer micro-
inequities and explicit exclusions beyond those experienced by more privileged
insiders. See Roach, supra, at 675-79. In addition, a culturally primed expectation
of unfavorable evaluation can create a self-fulfilling prophecy for nontraditional
students, especially where one-chance-only exams are used. As if this internally
and externally imposed emotional distress were not enough, many students also
experience a profound moral disillusionment with what seems to be the amoral
relativism of law professors and the hired-gun excesses of practicing lawyers. For
this they pay $20,000 a year to arrive in a depressed labor market!
13. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1083, 1091-1119 (1988) (discussing the use of ethical discretion when evalu-
ating a client's objectives); Paul Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering,
and Street Level Bureaucracy, 43 HAST. L.J. 947, 968-70 (1992) (focusing on the role
of the lawyer representing the poor and disadvantaged).
14. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 52-55
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competencies of a new discourse. Part III discusses the conserva-
tism of those very same competencies and focuses on the cognitive,
reading, and writing strategies, both personal and pedagogical,
which can incubate legal writers' more critical and purposeful dis-
course. Although the initial analysis will highlight lessons about
improving the traditional interpretive and communicative skills of
our students in light of and despite their past histories, this Arti-
cle's most important theme deals with nurturing a critical, trans-
formative perspective and expanding lawyers' capacity to produce a
more critical discourse in practice.
In addressing this central theme, the Article moves beyond the
outlines of critical consciousness and critical interpretation devel-
oped by others. It points to a transformative writing practice which
attempts to effect real results in the lives of individual clients and
group constituencies. This critical writing pedagogy addresses,
though it cannot resolve, the tension between a professional re-
gime of client-centered representation and the essential inequities
of the existing legal order. It addresses, but cannot resolve, how
that tension might be enacted in a more critical discourse in every-
day practice. Although I ultimately recommend increased use of
"outsider" narratives and of a less biased, less adversarial and more
feminist advocacy, I admit that I only begin to explore the discur-
sive practices which might confront power and still yield change.
II. TRACES OF PAST LITERACY: PASSIVE READING AND WEAK
WRITING DURING TRANSITIONAL PHASES
Students entering law school are prototypical examples of nov-
ices entering a new field. They draw on the repertoire of literacy
skills and strategies harvested from their secondary and postsecon-
dary school practice, and attempt to blend and adapt these cogni-
tive competencies to the more complex demands of legal dis-
course. The legacies of past practice significantly structure
students' current understandings of their reading and writing tasks,
reproducing habituated responses to new interpretive and writing
dilemmas. 15 Given their unfamiliarity with legal discourse practices,
15. SeeJohn Ackerman, Translating Context into Action, in READING-To-WRITE,
supra note 9, at 173. Ackerman writes:
[A] s teachers and researchers .... [w] e knew that the reading and writ-
ing behavior we saw was strongly influenced (if determined is too strong a
word) by these students' twelve years of public schooling and eighteen
years (or so) of living in a literate culture .... When we say that writing
7
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law students stumble and struggle during their border-crossing ex-
periences - during their process of discourse acculturation.
What students need to be helped to see, then, is that flu-
ency with certain rhetorical and linguistic commonplaces
- the specialized conventions of academic or professional
discipline - comes with practice, and... [that] the more
comfortable, routine commonplaces - the reading and
writing habits that won them success elsewhere - must be
examined, refined, and extended."
In this transitional phase, law students are hampered by three
related factors: (1) they unreflectively rely on previously learned
reading and writing strategies when tackling the more purposeful
literacy tasks they face; (2) they misapprehend the rhetorical pur-
poses of legal interpretation and legal discourse as involving pas-
sive summary and comment strategies, instead of more active
knowledge transformation strategies; and (3) they misapprehend
the discourse expectations and changed standards and conventions
held by their new community of readers - lawyers and judges.17 An
overarching problem is the students' essential passivity in interpret-
ing, applying, and discussing legal text - their unwillingness to ex-
plore what the law might be as well as their struggle with what it is.
18
A. Dilemmas in Comprehension and Interpretation of Legal Text
Composition experts have identified the key cognitive proc-
esses that constitute reading-to-write literacy, including: (1) moni-
toring for comprehension, (2) elaborating personal meaning, (3)
structuring themes and relationships, and (4) preliminary planning
for discourse strategies.' 9 The first three stages predominantly con-
cern reading and interpretation of text, where law students con-
front their first set of dilemmas in acculturating to the discourse
behavior is 'socially structured,' we mean that the topics, rhetorical
means, and linguistic conventions all have antecedents within a larger
literate culture. Any given act of writing echoes previous literate practice
and, more specifically, the literate practices of discourse communities.
Id.
16. Id. at 175-76; see also Williams, supra note 4, at 14-16, 24-30 (discussing a
process of u-shaped development and stages of pre-socialization, socialization, and
occasionally post-socialization).
17. See Flower, supra note 10, at 21-23.
18. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 164 (noting that "students are trained
to read only for facts, for information").
19. See Victoria Stein, Exploring the Cognition of Reading-to-Write, in READING-
To-WRITE, supra note 9, at 119, 121-24.
[Vol. 23
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss3/3
1997] CRITICAL DISCOURSE STRATEGIES FOR PRACTICE 499
community of lawyers. The last category, planning, concerns the
transition to writing where another set of dilemmas occurs.
First, through monitoring, readers maintain awareness of their
comprehension and overall progress in "constructing" meaning
from a text. Monitoring comprehension includes such skills as
paraphrasing and restating gists, and negotiating contradictions in
text interpretation. 20 Self-monitoring deepens one's comprehen-
sion of interpretive intentions and tracks one's progress in breath-
ing meaning into inert text. Readers use a number of monitoring
strategies to aid their comprehension and interpretation of text,
such as: (1) double-checking the authority of the author and the
historical time period of the text; (2) reading for introductions,
conclusions, and other signposts of meaning; (3) anticipating the
text's arguments and analyses; and (4) formulating questions to be
explored in the text. Thus, monitoring is the active process
whereby the reader pays most attention to the author's purposes,
word choice, and intended meaning.
Second, elaboration is the more subjective cognitive process
by which readers add their own meaning, material, and structure to
the source text "as prior knowledge combines with the source text
propositions to create new ideas and critical perspectives." 21 Fajans
and Falk differentiate passive, text-driven interpretive strategies
from stronger "transactional" strategies where students add their
own meaning. One of the paradoxes of students' writing practices
is that their extensive elaboration processes, captured in writing
protocol statements, frequently disappear from their actual texts.3
Although students use elaboration in their inner dialogue to criti-
cize and evaluate text based on their prior experience and to de-
velop ideas further and more deeply than the source text, students
abandon these elaborations in their intellectual subservience to the
20. See id. at 122.
21. Id. The need for elaboration, or integration of personal experience
with legal doctrine, has been expressly recognized by many legal educators. See,
e.g., Sossin, supra note 6, at 899-900 n.60 (citing Angela P. Davis & Marjorie M.
Shultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason": Toward Civil Virtue in Legal Education, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1773 (1993)). Davis and Shultz contend that classrooms become
both "boring and dangerous" when law teachers "seek to eliminate emotion from
legal discourse." Davis & Shultz, supra, at 1779-81.
22. SeeFajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 181.
23. See Victoria Stein, Elaboration: Using What You Know, in READING-TO-
WRrrE, supra note 9, at 144, 152 (stating that 78% of all elaborative propositions
were missing from the final text).
9
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gospel of the printed word.24 One explanation of why students ne-
glect to import their personal cognitive elaborations of a subject
into their study notes and their eventual text is that literate culture
teaches them to respect authority.25 In essence, students are self-
censoring in obedience to cultural practices which privilege re-
ceived wisdom over self-generated knowledge.26
Unfortunately, "students seemed unaware not only of the
value of the material they generated through elaboration, but also
of the value of the process of elaboration itself." 7 Although "stu-
dents elaborated freely and spontaneously," they did so unreflec-
tively and thus abandoned prematurely the power of their own in-
vention.28 Fortunately, this tendency to jettison one's own cognitive
work can be partially ameliorated. "[R]ecent research.., finds
that purposeful instruction in the process of elaboration not only
aids in comprehension and recall, but also facilitates depth of
processing and encourages critical thinking."
29
In structuring, the third cognitive component of literacy,
readers/writers shape and reshape source material and their own
elaborations. Most creatively, structuring activities involve "discov-
ering relations between ideas in the text that may not have been
apparent on reading alone."3 ° Structuring activities include: (1)
noticing instances of agreement, disagreement, and conflict; (2)
searching for organizing themes and superordinate categories; and
(3) arranging categories and sub-categories of proposition and
proof.3' This architecture of meaning consists of both analyzing
24. See id. at 153-54.
25. See Kathleen McCormick, The Cultural Imperatives Underlying Cognitive
Acts, in READING-TO-WRITE, supra note 9, at 194, 202 ("That students often wrote
simplistic essays while they had developed much more complex elaborations fur-
ther suggests the power of a dominant school ideology encouraging intellectual
passivity.").
26. The current-traditional ideology of text interpretation suggests that
"texts mean something," that they had coherence and clear meaning, which must
be decoded correctly. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 180. In contrast to this
simplistic approach, Fajans and Falk suggest a "transactional" approach where the
reader negotiates meaning derived from text sources and meaning incorporated
by prior life experiences resulting in analysis and interpretation. See id. at 181.
"To be strong readers, students must be weaned from their belief that reading is
about decoding or uncovering the one 'real' topic or theme of a text." Id. at 187.
27. Stein, supra note 23, at 154.
28. Id. at 154-55.
29. Id. at 146; see also Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 190-201 (reporting suc-
cess with their upper-level critical reading course).
30. Stein, supra note 19, at 122.
31. See Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, The-
[Vol. 23
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separate components of knowledge and integrating those parts
into a gestalt coherence. "In constructing meaning from sources,..
students... actively selected, connected, and organized information." 2
The fourth cognitive practice, planning, "plays a central role




Global planning of an entire text can help one "build more con-
nections, dig deeper into the material, and thus [permit] an even
closer, fine-grained analysis."34 One form of planning is the topical
outline which many inexperienced writers shun. Expert writers, on
the other hand, tend to spend much more time on planning activi-
ties and "they construct more fully elaborated and integrated
plans."35 Although such planning frequently occurs before writing,
it also occurs recursively as writers revise their plan consciously and
unconsciously according to the exigencies of their task and to the
meaning they discover in the writing process itself.
36
B. The Transition from Reading Law for Comprehension to Reading for
a Purpose
As members of a new discourse community, students' first dis-
advantage is their unfamiliarity with the key texts and text-types of
the lawyering community and with the analytical and purposeful
strategies lawyers employ when they read legal texts. Although
some students who are unusually precocious may find legal texts
easy to read, most students do not. Legal texts are organized
strangely; they have words students don't understand; and they rely
on unfamiliar authority and rhetorical moves. These texts are iso-
lated landmarks in a totally unfamiliar and vast discursive land-
scape.
ory and Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 287, 310-13 (1994) [here-
inafter, Baker, The Role of Context, Experience, Theory and Reflection in Ecological
Learning]; Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science,
and the Function of Theory, 45J. LEGAL EDUc. 313, 332-42 (1995).
32. Linda Flower, Negotiating Academic Discourse, in READING-To-WRirE, supra
note 9, at 221, 226.
33. Stein, supra note 19, at 122.
34. Id. at 133.
35. Id. at 122; see also Blasi, supra note 31, at 344-45 (discussing the tendency
of experts to spend more time in general on nonroutine problems).
36. See Wayne C. Peck, The Effects of Prompts on Revision: A Glimpse of the Gap
Between Planning and Performance, in READING-To-WRrrE, supra note 9, at 156, 164
(positing that writing protocols suggest "that many students were negotiating their
task, their text, and their situation as they planned and revised"); see also Fajans &
Falk, supra note 3, at 179-80.
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Even worse than unfamiliarity is students' initial misunder-
standing about the constructed meaning of law. Most novices in
any field, law included, hope that meaning is unitary and unambi-
guous.37 Law students hope that THE LAW is clearly, unequivo-
cally, and authoritatively articulated in statutes and cases. Yet, the
first rule of constructive reading is that meaning is made, not
found. 8 What we ordinarily call comprehension is no more than
the unreflective giving of meaning to indeterminate texts based on
personal and cultural interpretive practices of which we are largely
ignorant. Contrary to the first rule of constructive reading, stu-
dents think that their main task is a "concrete" one" - to find the
"key language" of a judicial opinion or of a statute - and that the
resulting language they find is unambiguously THE LAW.4° They
37. Fajans and Falk refer to this as the common-sense realist paradigm that
language accurately captures and conveys real experiences of the unmediated
world. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 173. Other commentators refer to the
realist paradigm as "the myth of literal meaning." Norris Minick, Teacher's Direc-
tives: The Social Construction of "Literal Meanings" and "Real Worlds" in Classroom Dis-
course, in UNDERSTANDING PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON AcrvIrY AND CoNTEXT 343,
371 (Seth Chaiklin & Jean Lave eds., 1993) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING
PRACTICE]. Minick states:
[T] he myth of literal meaning is merely one face of a broader myth that
posits a 'monistic' and 'objective' real world that can be discussed, de-
scribed, referred to, and indeed lived in. Just as the myth of literal
meaning posits a language that has meaning independent of local con-
cerns, interests, and perspectives - independent of the formation of
,temporary mutual commitments to shared perspectives' - the myth of
the 'monistic real world' posits a world that can be described and com-
prehended in isolation from such local concerns, perspectives, and
commitments.
Id. at 371; see also Britt et al., supra note 6, at 214-15 (discussing an "objectivist"
epistemology analogous to the "realist" and "literal meaning" perspectives).
38. "[T]oo rigid or superficial schematization of what they are reading
blinds students to the text's indeterminancies and openness to interpretation."
Fajans 8 Falk, supra note 3, at 171-72. For example, "holdings are not cast in
stone, inextricably memorialized in the language of the court, but can be framed
for persuasive purposes." Id. at 172.
39. Williams lists four common but overly "concrete" features of novice legal
writers, which flow from their unfamiliarity with the interpretive practices of legal
writers: (1) failure to redefine, paraphrase, or restructure legal problems as
posed by others; (2) extended discussion of self-evident banalities; (3) incompe-
tent and occasionally incoherent expression; and (4) over-reliance on legal jargon
or dialect. See Williams, supra note 4, at 18-23. This tendency of novice legal writ-
ers to focus on the concrete text is entirely consistent with the more general ten-
dency of novices to focus on the surface features of a problem rather than on its
deep structures. See Blasi, supra note 31, at 343-44.
40. See RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING:
STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE 220-25 (2d ed. 1994); WILLIAM P. STATSKY & R.
[Vol. 23
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss3/3
1997] CRITICAL DISCOURSE STRATEGIES FOR PRACTICE 503
naively think that understanding the law is simply locating the law
as stated and then parroting it to themselves and others so that they
will "sound" like lawyers.4 1 After this "ventriloquism," THE LAW
will unproblematically determine the single correct outcome of a
legal dispute.
Instead of this naive view, law students must understand that
comprehension of legal text is a constructive, cognitive act in which
new text must be interpreted pluralistically42 to create varied mean-
ings based on the prior discourse and interpretive experience of
each individual and based on the new purposes of lawyers.43 And
yet no student's reading can match that of a mature lawyer who
understands the conventional interpretive practices of her com-
munity" and, even more importantly, the multiple purposes to
which this existing text might be enlisted.45 In other words, legal
JOHN WERNET, JR., CASE ANALYSIS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING 142 (4th
ed. 1995) (discussing the so-called "crane" method).
41. "[Students'] papers are only 'a paraphrase away' from another author's
text." Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 180. The imperative to sound like a lawyer is
not simply a function of naivet6, however; it is also a function of students' desire
to fit in - to create the impression that they belong in the community of lawyers.
See Urs Fuhrer, Behavior Setting Analysis of Situated Learning: The Case of Newcomers,
in UNDERSTANDING PRACTICE, supra note 37, at 179, 198.
Many social psychological and social anthropological theories assume
that people are highly sensitive to the social significance of their con-
duct ... and are motivated to create desired impressions on others.
From this view, all behavior settings are potentially threatening for new-
comers.... What matters most to the newcomer is not how he or she
views his or her own behavior and its consequences, but rather how oth-
ers view them.
Id.
Phelps uses the much more vivid description of "tribal speech" in identifying
students' attempts to "sound like" a lawyer:
Law students too frequently acquire their new 'tribal speech' by imitat-
ing the style of the appellate opinions they read, by quoting judges'
words at length, and by incorporating alienating and stuffy legalese.
They cower behind their research, avoiding assertion, much less com-
mitment. They fraudulently enter their new discourse community by
adopting language not their own and by reneging in the struggle to find
their own valid professional voices.
Phelps, supra note 1, at 1102.
42. Jerome Bruner defines "pluralism" - one of the few universals of human
cognition - as "our dazzling intellectual capacity to envision alternatives." JEROME
BRUNER, AcTS OF MEANING 110 (1990).
43. "[S]tudents must see that the texts they produce are not merely para-
phrases and summaries of other texts, but also interpretations of the original text
as well as new works." Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 181.
44. See Williams, supra note 4.
45. "The purposive use of language is perhaps the only truly common de-
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novices are constructing unitary meaning for the text that they are
reading, but that meaning differs from the multiple meanings
given by expert practitioners who routinely recognize both the ca-
nonical ways in which legal text is interpreted and the pluralistic,
purposeful meanings which might reasonably be given to any legal
text. Practicing lawyers, in contrast to law students, ordinarily read
legal text with a particular instrumentalist purpose in mind, namely
to understand the legal matrix of a client's problem, to predict how
a future court might decide that problem, and to decide how to use
the legal precedent to argue in a client's favor. This sense of client-
based purpose gives rise to the second rule of constructive reading
- the meaning of legal text depends on the purpose. Thus, legal
meaning is pluralistic in both interpretation and purpose, subject
ultimately to community judgments about fair use and plausible re-
form.4
Accordingly, legal writing pedagogy's first task is to help stu-
dents bridge the gap between their naive, passive, purposeless read-
ing of legal text and the traditional interpretive purposes of lawyers
who read cases and statutes wondering how they might be applied
to their client problem, favorably and unfavorably. Gaining an in-
creased sense of authentic role, and thus of genuine purpose,
would give students-in-transition a tremendous advantage over de-
contextualized classroom reading. But having a lawyer's perspec-
tive and a more authentic purpose is not enough by itself. Students
also need practice, repeated practice, to learn the conventions law-
yers use in reading and writing about cases and statutes. This prac-
tice ensures that students' purposeful interpretations and produc-
tion of texts will become increasingly meaningful according to the
judgment and practices of their new community elders.47 Repeated
nominator among all forms of legal practice." Sossin, supra note 6, at 898. Fei-
genson posits:
Because lawyers write for a multitude of purposes and audiences and are
constantly faced with new situations, a good legal writer must also com-
prehend how the various roles she occupies (e.g., interviewer, counselor,
negotiator, advocate) shape her reasoning and writing, and must know
how to adapt her experiences and knowledge to new roles and contexts.
Feigenson, supra note 2, at 506.
46. "[L]anguage, as a powerful medium of gatekeeping, helps to create
boundaries that define discourse community memberships as well as acceptable
kinds of knowledge and discourse within those communities." Britt et al., supra
note 6, at 219.
47. "[SItudents must learn the traditional forms [of legal analysis and writ-
ing] or be excluded from the discourse community." Id. at 231. Learning these
conventions, however, does not necessarily take the form of transmission of pro-
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practice helps students to develop "situation sense" - to learn how
to recognize new contextual constraints and opportunities and how
to adapt habituated reading strategies to novel demands and pur-481
poses. It also exposes students to interwoven conventions of in-
terpretation, analysis, and discourse - conventions best "taught"
transactionally during the process of text interpretation and pro-
duction.49
C. Dilemmas in Text Production - The Legacy of Weak Writing Plans
and the Resulting Misrepresentation of Task
After helping students learn how to read law pluralistically
with legal purpose, most legal writing instructors understand that
their other most pragmatic task is to guide their students through
traditional forms of legal analysis and legal writing. Linda Flower
positional knowledge from a master to a novice. "[T]he master's effectiveness at
producing learning is not dependent on her ability to inculcate the student with
her own conceptual representations. Rather it depends on her ability to manage
effectively a division of participation that provides for growth on the part of the
student." William F. Hanks, Foreword to JEAN LAvE & ETIENNE WENGER, SITUATED
LEARNING: LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL PARTICIPATION 13, 21 (1991). "Quite simply, if
learning is about increased access to performance, then the way to maximize
learning is to perform, not to talk about it." Id. at 22.
48. Feigenson, supra note 2, at 505.
49. Legal writing textbooks are crammed with descriptions of conventional
legal discourse practices, e.g., IRAC, structures of legal proof, organizational
schemes, and citation practices. But the current list is relatively traditional in a
conservative sense. For a different kind of list of legal discourse strategies see
Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991) and
Karl Klare, Conventions on Legal Argument 1-12 (1994) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) (identifying common forms of legal argument arising
in first-year studies).
Unfortunately, most students cannot appreciate these conventions or rein-
terpret them to apply to their writing until they are in the throes of their own writ-
ing dilemmas. This does not mean that description of conventions is not useful to
them - it means that talk is most useful when it is timed to become part of their
performance.
It is... necessary to refine our distinction between talking about and talk-
ing within a practice. Talking within itself includes both talking within
(e.g., exchanging information necessary to the progress of ongoing ac-
tivities) and talking about (e.g., stories, community lore). Inside the
shared practice, both forms of talk fulfill specific functions: engaging,
focusing, and shifting attention, bringing about coordination, etc., on
the one hand; and supporting communal forms of memory and reflec-
tion, as well as signaling membership, on the other.... For newcomers
then the purpose is not to learn from talk as a substitute for legitimate
peripheral participation; it is to learn to talk as a key to legitimate pe-
ripheral participation.
LAVE & WENGER, supra note 47, at 109.
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has constructed a helpful taxonomy of the organizing plans most
frequently used by freshmen in structuring ideas for their first col-
lege essays - plans that are recycled later in law students' first writ-
ing projects. According to Flower's analysis, college freshmen de-
ploy a standard set of plans for organizing their writing projects
from the most to the least common: to summarize the readings, to
respond to the topic, to review and comment, to synthesize with a
controlling concept, and occasionally to interpret with their own
purpose.0 These plan-types are not simply developmental stages,
but the sequence does represent movement towards discourse
practice increasingly well-suited to lawyering.
Flower has found that students' writing plans are not prese-
lected from a conscious array of pre-set templates.' Instead, writers
construct a task representation (or writing plan) repeatedly and re-
cursively "integrating elements from a large set of options and
schemas."52 This constructive activity is rarely conscious. 3 "Deci-
sions usually rose to awareness only when the writer encountered a
problem or conflict, and not always then."54 Instead, students de-
fault subconsciously to the most common plans - summary, topic
response, and review and comment - because these are the infor-
mation-recitation plans most prized under traditional educational
criteria. Having been trained culturally to avoid ambiguity, to sim-
plify complexity, and to suppress their own engagement with tex-
tual authority, students slavishly follow the text and recite its most
soothing banalities.5
According to Flower's research, the most common discourse
strategy used by most reasonably literate writers is the gist-and-list
strategy:
The writer goes through the text looking for the main
points, finds an idea or term that links them, and uses that
to organize the text. This familiar strategy, the product of
years of paraphrasing, summarizing, and recitation in
school, is dominated by the text and fueled by the reading
56process.
50. See Flower, supra note 11, at 41-53.
51. See id. at 54.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 55.
54. Id.; see also Baker, The Role of Context, Experience, Theory and Reflection in
Ecological Learning, supra note 31, at 303-04.
55. See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 183-84; Williams, supra note 4, at 18-23.
56. Flower, supra note 32, at 235.
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In the legal context, this strategy implies a passive, uncritical accep-
tance and reliance on the actual words of a reported decision. 7 In
analyzing multiple cases, the gist-and-list strategy results in each
case being reported seriatim in summary form. Little effort is
made to synthesize cases, to apply cases to client facts, or to activate
one's law-making or meaning-making authority to develop and
prove legal contentions in furtherance of one's goals of prediction,
persuasion, or reform.
A second common discourse strategy is the TIA strategy - the
"that's True, Important, I Agree" strategy - which relies on the stu-
dent's agreement and disagreement with the text.5 8  The legal
equivalent of this strategy is selecting only those cases, and those
interpretations and applications of cases, that are favorable to one's
client. Such analysis is one-sided, unreliable, and contains many
unexplained gaps and absences. This strategy pays too little atten-
tion to the actual authority of legal text within a system of stare deci-
sis and legislative enactment and to the ethical mandate that law-
yers must report all governing authority to the court. 59
Somewhat less frequently, students use a dialogue strategy
which combines the gist-and-list and TIA strategies so that the stu-
dent actively engages the text, her own ideas, and then "negotiates"
her understanding of the ideas in question.60 A law student em-
ploying a dialogue strategy is more likely to wrestle with legal doc-
trine and precedent, to elaborate and connect the law with her
personal experience, and to apply the law more comprehensively
to client facts. This is an improved strategy, but one that still evi-
dences unfamiliarity with more sophisticated purposes for legal
writing and the particular demands of a legal audience.
57. As Feigenson has noted, some of our legal writing texts support passive
reading and interpretive strategies. See Feigenson, supra note 2, at 512 (reviewing
DIANA V. PRATr, LEGAL WRITING: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH (1989)). On the other
hand, some texts are more "open" to interpretation than others. Many have ar-
gued "that it is impossible to construct linguistic representations that correspond
fully and unambiguously with a single 'intended meaning.'" Minick, supra note
37, at 347. In legal writing, however, there is considerable effort to accomplishing
precisely this end, which necessitates more attention to the actual words of certain
legal texts. In many instances, lawyers have to pay exquisite attention to probable
intended meaning in interpreting certain legal texts; similarly, lawyers frequently
struggle to convey intended meaning in their own text production.
58. See Flower, supra note 32, at 235.
59. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY DR 7-106(B) (1) (1980);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (a) (3) (1983).
60. See Flower, supra note 32, at 236; Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 181 (re-
ferring to dialogue with text as a "transactional" strategy).
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Relying on these three interrelated strategies, the standard
writing plan of most law students is simply to report what they now
know, that is to write the wrong text.6 Students struggle with ob-
tuse writing assignments in unfamiliar classrooms within a new dis-
course community because they are unclear about their readers'
expectancies, standard format conventions, and canonical discur-
sive and analytical practices. As they struggle, they experience
enormous difficulty in responding to environmental clues, which
translates into further difficulty in planning their task.62 "Students
may be caught in a tacit transitions [sic] in which the cues to
change are subtle, but their significance is far reaching., 63 Instead
of accurately inferring the poorly expressed intentions of their le-
gal writing instructor or legal supervisor, students may superimpose
the weak writing plans with which they are most familiar, whether
they are fully appropriate or not.6 The texts resulting from these
weak plans maintain a startling resistance to revision. "The first re-
sponse to an assignment, by habit and practical necessity, is an in-
vestment writers do not easily cast aside, even when they benefit
most by rethinking and starting anew."65 Therefore, it behooves us
61. See Flower, supra note 32, at 238-39. Flower notes that the three strate-
gies lead students to write quick and superficial papers that do not transform their
knowledge into useful intellectual or rhetorical tools. Consequently, the students
communicate irrelevant and useless information to their readers. See id.
62. Despite making this point about a novel context's opaqueness, context is
the most powerful force in structuring students' expectancies and activities. Stu-
dents interact with their environment in remarkably robust ways and receive a
plethora of implicit clues which support and guide their performance. See Baker,
The Role of Context, Experience, Theory and Reflection in Ecological Learning, supra note
31, at 295-324; Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 184; James F. Stratman, The Emer-
gence of Legal Composition as a Field of Inquiry: Evaluating the Prospects, 60 REv. EDUC.
RES. 153 (1990).
63. Flower, supra note 32, at 249.
64. See Flower, supra note 11, at 35. Flower notes that as readers and writers,
[w]e respond to the problems we pose. The process of task representa-
tion begins when the problem solver begins consciously or unconsciously
to represent the givens and constraints of this situation, the goals she
would attain, and the strategies or actions she might take, since together
these constitute the problem she is solving.
Id. at 38.
Other researchers de-emphasize the importance of a so-called task represen-
tation in approaching a novel performance and point instead to the idea of par-
ticipating more meaningfully in a social role and community practice that organ-
ize performance organically. See, e.g., Hanks, supra note 47, at 17.
65. Ackerman, supra note 15, at 178. Unlike novices, most experts spend
more time structuring and diagnosing the problem space and more effort rede-
fining the problem to be solved during their ongoing task performance. See id. at
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to discover pedagogical interventions that help students counter-
mand the legacy of weak plans.
D. The Transition to Conscious Plans and More Purposeful Writing
To counteract the momentum of habituated writing plans, le-
gal writing instructors and practice supervisors must focus explicitly
on the writing plan as part of their task supervision. In addition,
writing coaches must: (1) clearly describe and clarify writing as-
signments, (2) explain the context of the writing project and the
applicable conventions of practice, and (3) encourage the students
to be more self-aware and purposeful in their writing.
To decrease reliance on habituated writing plans, legal writing
instructors and practice supervisors first must be as clear as possible
about the need for an appropriate writing plan and even clearer in
describing the parameters of the initial assignments. Students fre-
quently do not understand what they are being asked to do.66 They
need to know, among other things, the relevant facts, the proce-
dural posture, the client's needs and interests, the intended audi-
ence, time and resource constraints, and format expectations. De-
spite the clarity of initial task representation, they also need to
reformulate their task by noticing "cues from the context and evok-
ing relevant memories"67 and by getting clarification from their su-
pervisors or instructors. Students are especially open to mid-course
corrections during collaborative writing-in-progress conferences
where they can receive suggestions, exemplars, and other forms of
support and guidance.6 Although students' resulting revisions
usually lead to improved task performance, such adjustments also
can generate discontinuities of voice, style, and content, 69 unless
the student is careful to "re-read" and "re-write" the entire text.
70
Even when supervisors give "clear" assignments and even when
students clarify writing plans and ruminate about their writing pro-
jects, "they must still 'read' the situation," a process fraught with in-
192.
66. See Flower, supra note 11, at 36.
67. Id. at 56.
68. See Baker, Implications for Research, Analysis, and Writing Programs,
supra note 6, at 73-78; Baker, Connection and Expertise in the Workplace, supra
note 6, at 77-79.
69. See Flower, supra note 11, at 58.
70. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 179-80 (discussing the recursive proc-
ess of text production and the writer's reader-response during the composition
process).
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terpretive error." Although we might assume that novices can map
the landscape of a novel discourse setting, this assumption clearly is
unwarranted. Thus, as a second strategy "to move students along
the continuum of discourse experience, we need to give them ex-
perience and practice and a more demystifying insight into [the
context and] the conventions of the discourse before them."
Clarity about both context and convention is critical. If students
increase their sensitivity to the myriad, complex contextual clues,
they should be able to respond even more fluidly and fluently to its
constraints, resources, and opportunities. However, the immedi
ate social context does not always provide direct clues to the estab-
lished conventions of a social practice domain. These conventions
are hidden as work product in other files or as performances be-
hind closed doors. Thus, articulation of the conventions of prac-
tice is a valuable resource in the development of expertise.4
Lastly, because students will not always have instructors to ex-
plain assignments, context, and conventions of practice, Flower
suggests that increased meta-cognitive control of literacy - aware-
ness of one's rhetorical context and discourse processes - is neces-
sary to improve fluency with a novel discourse and the writing tasks
it requires. 75 "Although task representation may influence all that
follows, the process is often carried out with little or no awareness
on the part of the writer. 76 Thus, " [t] he problem in teaching is to
help students learn to invoke conscious choice and evaluative
awareness on complex problems that need them" instead of simply
relying on well-established, automated writing plans. To improve
their appreciation of their context and their writing task, Flower
recommends that "writers... monitor their own process, noticing what
they are thinking and what they have done so far, reflecting on
whether it is working."78 "Under these circumstances the writer's
goals, constraints, and possible strategies themselves become the
objects of thought as writers engage in... 'intentional cogni-
71. Flower, supra note 11, at 63.
72. Id. at 67.
73. See id. at 68 (stating that "[c]ritical literacy and critical consciousness
are states of heightened awareness - knowing the covert messages the context is
sending and [the writer's] own assumptions and habits of response").
74. See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 176; Blasi, supra note 31, at 355-61, 377-
78.
75. See Flower, supra note 11, at 67.
76. Id. at 40.
77. Id. at 41.
78. Id. at 70.
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tion." 7 9 By this process of intentional cognition, the implicit but
incomplete recognition of contextual opportunities and con-
straints is augmented by the technologies of conscious reassess-
ment, with the likelihood that richer, better practice will result.8 °
It is not enough to monitor one's discourse processes. Stu-
dents also must become purposeful in their writing. Although the
subconscious, knowledge-driven writing plans students bring from
their formative writing experiences are sufficient for many tasks,
they are woefully inadequate for the goal-oriented writing of law-
yers and judges.8 1 Legal readers expect more than a dispassionate
report of existing legal authority and mechanical, conclusory ap-
plication of that authority to the facts of a client's case. Experi-
enced legal supervisors and decision-makers expect young lawyers
to use a purposeful knowledge-adaptation strategy to reconstruct
pre-existing legal authority in support of a rhetorical purpose, ei-
ther to predict how a future decision-maker will decide the case or
to make persuasive arguments to that decision-maker in order to
advance the client's paramount interests. 83
What has changed the most [in the transition from school
to a professional discourse] is not the apparent genre or
conventions, but the goals. The goals of self-
directed... inquiry, of using writing to think through
79. Id. Philip Kissam refers to this monitoring not as metacognition but as a
"critical writing process." Philip Kissam, Thinking (by Writing) About Legal Writing,
40 VAND. L. REV. 135, 140-41 (1987). Kissam writes:
[T]he critical writing process allows the writer's mind to function like a
'radar scope that plays continually over one's own text' in ways that can
force the writer to confront and control hard issues more directly and
more creatively than is possible with non-written thought. This special
perspective thus can enhance the creation of new thoughts, the articula-
tion of complex thoughts, and the recognition of subtleties, nuances,
and qualifications that are so important to the art of lawyering.
Id. Studies of expertise in many areas have demonstrated that experts, rather
than novices, in general are more likely to exercise self-monitoring skills. See
Blasi, supra note 31, at 358-60; Baker, Connection and Expertise in the Workplace,
supra note 6, at 57-59 and sources cited therein.
80. See Flower, supa note 11, at 68.
81. See Flower, supra note 32, at 239; see also Allen Boyer, Legal Writing Pro-
grams Reviewed: Merits, Flaws, Costs and Essentials, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 24
(1985) (stating that "[g]rades in substantive courses help students obtain starting
positions, but it is research and writing skills which make careers").
82. See Flower, supra note 32, at 239.
83. See, e.g., Flower, supra note 32, at 239, 248-49. "Full-fledged members of
[the academic discourse community] are... expected to speak as contributors
with the authority of their own thinking" to utilize strategic knowledge. Id. at 249.
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genuine problems and issues, and of writing to an imag-
ined community of peers with a personal rhetorical pur-
pose - these distinguish academic [and legal] writing
from a more limited comprehension and response.84
In sum, our students must consciously learn the purposeful, rhe-
torical strategies of lawyers in reconstituting legal authority to the
demands of client goals in order to acquire even the standard rep-
ertoire of legal discourse skills.
III. NURTURING THE FORMATION OF CRITICAL
DISCOURSE STRATEGIES
A. Developing Critical Awareness and a Critical Writing Practice
Critique, as a literacy skill, evidences a resistant cognitive
stance to the dogmas of text and community - both in text inter-
pretation and in text production. Unfortunately, unexamined cul-
tural imperatives can blind students to the potential of a more
powerful, more autonomous, more resistant stance in their reading
and writing.85 Unless they are challenged, cultural mandates super-
impose their strictures on every feature of our students' writing.
86
For example, student essays, academic writing, and law-related writ-
ing typically require authors to "efface" themselves from the text.
8 7
In addition to desubjectifying the author, current literacy practices
also valorize coherence, closure, and unity at the expense of ambi-
guity, contradiction, and conflict.m The forced "discovery and re-
production of a unified meaning in texts [coherence and closure]
is just one way in which a society asserts its consistency and stabil-
ity." 89 As a result, students are forced to become painfully "aware of
the authority of the printed word - and that authority generally
carries with it connotations of unity and consistency."90
Legal academics in many subdisciplines have produced reams
of critical scholarship challenging accepted literacy practices, legal
84. Id. at 251 (emphasis omitted).
85. See McCormick, supra note 25, at 195.
86. See id. at 195-96.
87. See id. at 197, 206-09. McCormick notes that "[1learning to succeed [in
school or in the courtroom] by effacing oneself as a subject is just one of the
many social apparatuses that helps to fragment and decenter the subject." Id. at
197.
88. See id. at 199.
89. Id. at 205.
90. Id. at 214-15.
[Vol. 23
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authority, legal institutions and, indeed, the entire system of jus-
tice:
The legal writers who urge a critical perspective on the
law... [use] the intellectual tools of Marxism, structural-
ism, and post-modernism to destabilize support for the
status quo. The critical legal studies movement, the criti-
cal feminist movement, the critical race movement, and
the critical clinical movement all point to abhorrent social
conditions and codified power imbalances which privilege
some and radically disadvantage others. They distrust the
rule of law, legal institutions, prevailing forms of legal
practice, and legal culture at the same time that they hold
forth some hope for resistance and interstitial change."
Although some critical discourse scholars have joined the
larger critical project and urged students "to look for unstated or
unacknowledged cultural assumptions and institutional pressures
motivating cognitive acts,"9 it is unclear that this critical discourse
scholarship has attracted the attention of legal writing specialists as
a whole.93 As a consequence, we are largely unfamiliar with the
possibility of nurturing a more critical stance in our students.
Nonetheless, some legal writing specialists have begun to propose a
pedagogy of critiquei 4 Sossin, for example, explicitly calls for a
more political pedagogy. "Effective legal writing instruction en-
91. Baker, Connection and Expertise in the Workplace, supra note 6, at 118;
see also Britt et al., supra note 6, at 213 (describing how these movements "are tak-
ing up these [critical] interpretive methods to illustrate how law, as a rhetorical
system, supports existing social relationships while claiming to do otherwise").
92. Ackerman, supra note 15, at 197.
93. See Sossin, supra note 6, at 900-01. "[W]hat is normally taught in [legal
reading and writing classes] - the form of a memo, the anatomy of the library, the
'grammar of law' - historically has been taught in a one-dimensional fashion, con-
veying only a singular and status-quo oriented vision of legal communication." Id.
However, a recent survey of legal writing specialists by Nancy Millich of Santa
Clara University Law School discovered dozens of instances (51) where legal writ-
ing instructors had used writing assignments addressing social and diversity con-
cerns. See Nancy Millich, Summary of Legal Writing Problems Raising Issues of
Diversity or Social Concern (July 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
94. See Britt et al., supra note 6, at 231-34; Patrick Ewick & Susan S. Silbey,
Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 197, 221 (1995) ("Knowing the rules and perceiving a concealed
agenda enhance the possibilities of intervention and resistance."); Teresa Godwin
Phelps, Narratives of Disobedience: Breaking/Changing the Law, 40J. LEGAL EDUC. 133
(1990) (discussing narratives of disobedience as instrumental in changing legal
understanding); Sossin, supra note 6, at 900-01.
95. See Sossin, supra note 6, at 894-95.
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courages students not only to explore the law but also, ideally, to
articulate a notion of justice."96 For her, legal writing pedagogy
should "be about more than merely learning the structure and
strategy of legal communications; it should also challenge first-year
law students to explore the politics of legal discourse."97 Sossin ar-
gues that "[s]tudents should be required both to research and
write 'like a lawyer' and also to see the social, political, and eco-
nomic implications of this form of discourse, and to be aware of
the alternatives. " 98
Likewise, Britt and her colleagues also call for a more critical
pedagogy deconstructing legal language and the power it displays:
"[A] nalysis of law's rhetoric is... part and parcel of a political and
ethical project whose object is the transformation of law in the
name of justice all too rarely spoken about in the profession of
law."99 They urge students to recognize their power to reconceptu-
alize the world in every act of interpretation. 100
[I]nterpretation, because it involves the privileging of
some points of views over others, is always already politi-
cal. Interpretations cannot help but include the morality
of the interpreters: how the interpreters view the world
and the way the world should be, and their beliefs about
what measures are necessary or reasonable for creating
the kind of world they want. TM
According to Fajans and Falk, who have also self-consciously
joined the critical project, "[t]o read judicial opinions closely and
critically is to talk back to power."'02 "Exploration of these hidden
or 'master' stories - drowned shapes in the depths of our culture -
is a crucial, but neglected enterprise." 10 3 They propose adding mul-
tiple interpretive voices from various jurisprudential and critical
traditions to deepen and broaden students' pluralistic engagement
with legal precedent. ' °4 In addition, they recommend several spe-
cific critical heuristics in reading legal texts: "to read cases for what
96. Id. at 903.
97. Id. at 909.
98. Id. at 901.
99. Britt et al., supra note 6, at 213 (citing THE RHETORIC OF LAW: THE
AMHERST SERIES IN LAW, JURISPRUDENCE, AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 3 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas Kearns eds., 1994)).
100. SeeAckerman, supra note 15, at 173, 193.
101. Britt et al., supra note 6, at 225-26.
102. Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 165.
103. Id. at 199.
104. See id. at 192.
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is implicit there - literary style and jurisprudential or interpretive
posture - and for what is not there at all - legal and historical con-
text and omissions of fact or lapses in logic."0
In sum, according to these scholars, if we want to undo the
cultural mandates of passive, objective, simplistic, and uncritical lit-
eracy, we must first change the culture of the classroom and even-
tually of the law office and courtroom."'
This goal [of critical resistance and transforma-
tion] ... can be attained only in a rich [counter]cultural
context that rids itself of the subjective/objective para-
digm, that situates the positions of experts, and that
grants credibility to the positions of students by giving
them, indeed requiring them to develop, a voice that
must be as closely scrutinized as those of the experts. 
7
By exposing our students to systems of contemporary cultural criti-
cism, these scholars argue that we can reduce their subservience to
the written word by making students even more aware that texts in
general, and law texts in particular, are always ambiguous, usually
contradictory, and thus places of contested social meaning.
1 0 8
Despite the spirit and strength of this scholarship, it has not
yet offered critical writing strategies to practicing lawyers. Having a
critical consciousness and a critical interpretive practice is rare
enough, but acting on that critique is rarer yet, though some law-
yers, albeit in small numbers, have written critical texts which have
helped to reshape the matrix of law itself. Nonetheless, critical
writing in the field of practice is a forceful political act - one that
unsettles the ideological beliefs, assumptions, habits, and practices
of one's professional domain. Despite limited but powerful exam-
ples from practice, most critical discourse scholars have simply
105. Id. at 169. In a more detailed list, Fajans and Falk recommend: (1)
reading for jurisprudential and interpretive posture; (2) reading for case context
and historical context; (3) reading for rhetorical style and voice; (4) reading for
master narratives; and (5) reading for omissions. See id. at 193-201.
106. See id. at 204-05. Fajans and Falk argue that "to be effective practitio-
ners and to make a contribution to the ongoing discourse of the legal community,
students of our text-dominated discipline must learn to read - and thus to think
and write - for themselves." Id.
107. McCormick, supra note 25, at 209; see also Phelps, supra note 1, at 1090-
91 (asserting that lawyering requires the development of a personal and profes-
sional voice).
108. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 25, at 215. "Even texts that appear co-
herent, therefore, can often be regarded as sites of struggle, as semiotic battle-
fields in which diverse and often contradictory meanings compete for domi-
nance." Id.
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urged a more robust reading pedagogy and the production of a
more critical scholarship to internal audiences, rather than a dis-
course pedagogy aimed at the production of critical lawyering texts
by practicing lawyers for real-world decision-makers.' 9 Similarly, it
seems fair to note, notwithstanding certain exceptions, that the
critical legal studies movement and other critical subdisciplines
primarily have produced scholarship rather than court documents
or legislation. Thus, even though an extraordinarily rich body of
critical scholarship has filled thousands of pages of law reviews dur-
ing the past twenty years, an obvious question arises. Why is there
no pedagogy for critical writing in practice and/or why hasn't the
academy's critical discourse transferred to the world of practice on
its own accord?
The answer to this question revolves around the familiar rhe-
torical issues of context, audience, and purpose, supplemented by
a big dose of raw political power. First, the context of most law
professors is a context of classroom pedagogy and scholarly writing.
This situation reality serves as a template for our imagination,
blinding us perhaps to the complicated discourse realities that law-
yers, judges, and legislators face.
Second, although there certainly are institutional and cultural
constraints on producing critical scholarship - constraints relating
to tenure, to political acceptability, to selection preferences of law
review editors, et cetera - law professors and students lack the law-
yer's clients and a client base. At least in private practice, where
most lawyers write, lawyers must pay exquisite attention to the
needs of individual clients and additional attention to getting paid
and attracting new clients. Lawyers, unlike academics, do not get
paid or gain professional stature merely by producing critical texts.
Third, legal scholarship has an audience of one's immediate
peers who are willing to tolerate if not embrace more critical per-
spectives. Critique, especially balanced, rational critique, is one of
the alleged foundational premises of the Academy. Lawyers, on
the other hand, have judges and legislatures as their audience.
Thus, there is a much greater challenge to meet the expectations
109. See Britt et al., supra note 6, at 231-34 (discussing unspecified texts to be
analyzed in an upper-level course as social constructs); Fajans & Falk, supra note 3,
at 201 (discussing assignment of a scholarly paper or a law review note); Sossin,
supra note 6, at 904-13 (discussing introspective writing project in "memo" form
that combines an analysis of the "best argument" [by what criteria?], a prediction
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of socialized and privileged legal decision-makers. These audi-
ences are infused with the hegemonic rules of culture and law; they
have conscious and unconscious perspectives, ideologies, and
commitments favoring the status quo and privileging certain narra-
tive accounts, social rules, and forms of reasoning and argumenta-
tion.
Fourth, although legal scholars might write in part to change
the world, their immediate purposes are more plebeian - they want
to demonstrate familiarity with ongoing academic dialogues and
(occasionally) to offer new knowledge. Lawyers, in contrast, have
immediate demands on power - they want to help a client to get
out ofjail, win a court case, negotiate a takeover, or lobby success-
fully. Likewise, lawyers must use the institutions of state power to
achieve tolerable outcomes for their clients. As much as scholars
work in universities infused with power relations, practitioners ac-
tually battle at the front lines of power, where immediate decisions
are made and longer-lasting principles are forged.
As a result of all these differences in context, audience, pur-
pose, and power, critical academic writing may suggest strategies
for a more critical discourse in practice. But the conventions and
forms of the Academy cannot be incorporated unproblematically
into lawyers' writing. Developing a critical discourse is fraught with
contradictions arising from lawyers' competing obligations to act
and write zealously on behalf of clients on the one hand, and to re-
sist dogma and write transformatively in furtherance of community
interests and social justice on the other. Nonetheless, legal writing
specialists might consider the efficacy of increased reliance on: (1)
using subversive outsider-narratives; (2) confronting and avoiding
appeals to bias; and (3) using a more dialogic, less adversarial,
more feminist discourse. Although teaching - in the sense of a
classroom pedagogy - may play some small part in nurturing such
discourse strategies, the more promising pedagogy is situational
and participatory. Legal writing instructors will have to help create
a more transformative legal discourse community or subcommu-
nity within and beyond the Academy which will afford novices with
enriched opportunities to develop an increasingly effective and
engaged critical discourse in the world of practice.
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B. Contradictions of Purpose in Client Representation, Guild
Membership, and Critical Discourse
Undertaking a more critical discourse strategy is fraught with
contradictions at the heart of lawyering. On the one hand, lawyers
are exhorted to act zealously on behalf of their clients and to use
all lawful means to accomplish their clients' lawful objectives, even
if those objectives are unduly oppressive to others and contrary to
proper social ordering for the larger community.10° On the other
hand, lawyers have obligations to the interests of the court that the
law be argued respectfully"' and with some fidelity to precedent
110. According to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a]
[l]awyer [s]hould [r]epresent a [c]lient [z]ealously [w]ithin the [b]ounds of the
[l]aw." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). "The duty
of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client
zealously .... [E]ach member of our society is entitled... to seek any lawful ob-
jective through legally permissible means." Id. EC 7-1. Although the lawyer may
not assert legal positions which are frivolous, he or she must urge a construction
of law favorable to his or her client "without regard to his professional opinion as
to the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail." Id. EC 7-4. Like-
wise, although the lawyer may not pursue a client's preferred course of action
merely to harass or unduly oppress others, see id. DR 7-102(A)(1), and although a
lawyer may seek to avoid that which is unjust or which might inflict needless
harm, see id. EC 7-9, 7-10, if the client's objectives and means are lawful, the lawyer
must pursue them, see id. DR 7-101 (A) (1). Finally, though a lawyer may counsel
the client about probable legal outcomes, harsh consequences, and the moral
implications of the client's plans, "the decision whether to forgo legally available
objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client...."
Id. EC 7-8. Commentators have taken this well-established rule of zealous advo-
cacy to create a role-based morality for lawyer-as-legal-friend. This stance is alleg-
edly sanctioned by existing moral principles that lawyers can do all that friends
ordinarily do for each other so long as the conduct is not prohibited by ethical
rules, even if the conduct causes harm to others. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Law-
yer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE. L.J.
1060, 1071-76 (1976) (suggesting that lawyers are special purpose friends who
adopt client interests as their own). For more extended analyses of the traditional
conception of zealous advocacy, see LUBAN, supra note 14, at 11-18; Bill Ong Hing,
In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for the Common
Good, 47 STAN. L. REv. 901, 917-37 (1995) (discussing the boundaries of zealous
advocacy within cases involving racial conflict); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at
the Limits of Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1587-98 (1995) (discussing the extent of discretion the law allows law-
yers when advising clients regarding illegal & immoral activity); and Paul R.
Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 9, 12-22 (1995) (summa-
rizing professional and philosophical defenses of the standard conception of zeal-
ous advocacy).
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and legislative will; " 2 lawyers have obligations to the interests of
party-opponents and witnesses that they be treated fairly and with
respect;11 3 and lawyers have additional obligations to their fellow at-
torneys, litigation opponents, and negotiating partners 4 where the
survival of dispute resolution outcomes and transactional agree-
ments might depend on fair accommodation of competing goals
and interests. " 5 Beyond these immediate interpersonal and institu-
tional obligations, lawyers are the gatekeepers to the halls of justice
- to legislative and administrative forums, to judicial chambers, and
to the private conference rooms where most disputes and most
deals are actually resolved or consummated. As gatekeepers, law-
yers exert enormous influence not only on who gets access to legis-
lative bodies, judicial dispute resolution, and private contractual
ordering, but also on the content of the law itself and the quality of
Judicial hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and orderly
procedures designed to protect the rights of all parties. Although a law-
yer has the duty to represent his client zealously, he should not engage
in any conduct that offends the dignity and decorum of proceedings.
While maintaining his independence, a lawyer should be respectful,
courteous, and above-board in his relations with a judge or hearing offi-
cer before whom he appears.
Id.
112. See id. EC 7-23. The model code states:
The adversary system contemplates that each lawyer will present and ar-
gue the existing law in the light most favorable to his client. Where a
lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly ad-
verse to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal of its ex-
istence.., but having made such disclosure, he may challenge its
soundness in whole or in part.
Id. "In his representation of the client, a lawyer shall not... [k]nowingly make a
false statement of law. .. ." Id. DR 7-102(A) (5).
113. See id. EC 7-10 ("The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal
does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all
persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless
harm."); id. EC 7-25 ("[A] lawyer should not ask a witness a question solely for the
purpose of harassing or embarrassing him .... .").
114. See id. EC 7-37 ("In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and
though ill feeling may exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a
lawyer in his conduct, attitude, and demeanor towards opposing lawyers."); id. EC
7-38 ("[A] lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should accede to
reasonable requests regarding court proceedings, settings, continuances, waiver of
procedural formalities, and similar matters which do not prejudice the rights of
his client. He should follow local customs of courtesy or practice .. ").
115. See Lon L. Fuller &John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of
the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1162 (1958) (arguing that an important part
of transactional lawyering "is to design a framework of collaboration that will func-
tion in such a way that litigation will not arise").
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negotiated deals." 6 What lawyers argue for and negotiate is a large
component of what the law actually is.
These contradictions between constituencies and interests are
not solved simply by a purposeful, knowledge-adaptation strategy; it
takes a critical discourse strategy to negotiate even provisional reso-
lutions to these complexities. This alternative, critical discourse
strategy is not subject solely to the demands of a single client or cli-
ent group, but must pay heed to the moral authority and agency of
the lawyer and to the interests of other constituencies in rationaliz-
ing or ameliorating the oppressive legal and social-political ar-
rangements which plague our society."7 In developing critical
116. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REV. 468,
477 (1990) (stating "lawyers have more practical power than judges to manipulate
the legal terrain").
117. Not unsurprisingly, lawyers' ethical codes do not talk about legal and
social oppression - too loaded, too political. They do, however, use more polite
language to describe lawyers' obligations to seek law reform and to enhance the
justice mission of the law. "A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal Sys-
tem." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1980). "If a lawyer
believes that the existence or absence of a rule of law, substantive or procedural,
causes or contributes to an unjust result, he should endeavor by lawful means to
obtain appropriate changes in the law." Id. EC 8-2. "A lawyer should render pub-
lic interest legal service .... by service in activities for improving the law, the le-
gal system or the legal profession." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule
6.1 (1983). The aspirational standard has been reaffirmed in the recent MacCrate
Report, especially in the section on Fundamental Values of the Profession:
Value § 2: Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality. As a member
of a profession that bears special responsibilities for the quality of justice,
a lawyer should be committed to the values of:
2.1 Promotion of Justice, Fairness, and Morality in One's Own Daily
Practice;
2.2 Contributing to the Profession's Fulfillment of Its Responsibilities to
Ensure that Adequate Legal Services Are Provided to Those Who Cannot
Afford to Pay for Them;
2.3 Contributing to the Profession's Fulfillment of Its Responsibility to
Enhance the Capacity of Law and Legal Institutions to Do Justice.
American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar,
Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 140-41
(1992).
Commentators, too, historically have championed the lawyer's obligation to
seek justice. See, e.g., Fuller & Randall, supra note 115, at 1217 ("The special obli-
gation of the profession with respect to law reform rests on considerations too ob-
vious to require enumeration."). In more recent times, a whole cottage industry
has developed which attacks the standard conception of lawyering and which
proposes more activist approaches. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 14, at 57 (noting
that the lawyer's duty in an adversarial proceeding is "one-sided partisan zeal in
advocating her client's position"); Simon, supra note 13, at 1083 ("Lawyers should
have ethical discretion to refuse to assist in the pursuit of legally permissible
[Vol. 23
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strategies, students, even novice students, must be encouraged to
think about what the law should be rather than what it is now; they
should consider how the law might be reinterpreted and reformed
to achieve social justice rather than to further the present, narrow,
and privileged interests of powerful individuals and institutional
clients. As a necessary precondition to addressing this wider range
of competing interests, students must move beyond understanding
their discourse competency as a technical, instrumentalist skill and
must reconceptualize discourse as a moral, political, social activity
that actually helps constitute the next day in our social world."1
8
Maintaining critical awareness about the moral weight of legal
discourse and the aspirational possibilities of progressive law re-
form and social change necessarily complicates lawyers' relations
with their clients and with their clients' future texts. If one concep-
tualizes the lawyer-client relationship as a client-centered one
which gives primary legal and moral authority to the client 9 and if
courses of action and in the assertion of potentially enforceable legal claims. This
discretion involves not a personal privilege of arbitrary decision, but a profes-
sional duty of reflective judgment."); Tremblay, supra note 110, at 12-22; Richard
Wasserstrom, Lauryers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1, 12-15
(1975-76) (discussing role-differentiated behavior resulting in professional amo-
rality).
118. See Sossin, supra note 6, at 888. "To teach that how lawyers use lan-
guage is technical and apolitical, that the same 'rules' apply whether in a poverty
clinic or a Wall Street firm, with the wealthy and indigent client, in my view, pres-
ents a dangerous and misleading vision of the legal world." Id.
119. See DAVID BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 135-91 (1977). Binder and Price rely on the client-
centered counseling model of Carl Rogers for the theoretical underpinnings of
this conception. They advocate a process of legal counseling designed to foster
client decision-making free from domination and preemption by the lawyer. Ad-
vocates of client-centeredness long have questioned the propriety of trying to in-
fluence the client to accept the lawyer's preferred solution to the client's prob-
lem. Binder and Price's text is the classic presentation of the client-centered
model. See also Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation
Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 811, 843-62 (1987) (extending the client-centered model to integrate coun-
seling and negotiation paradigms).
Professor Robert Dinerstein exhaustively has catalogued the systemic argu-
ments in favor of client-centered counseling. See Robert Dinerstein, Client-Centered
Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 501, 512-56 (1990). The
core argument supporting client decision-making is that by stifling the lawyer's
paternalism and coercive expressions of preferences, the client's individual
autonomy is enhanced. See id. at 512-17. Dinerstein argues that client-
centeredness advances a political agenda of empowering poor clients and perhaps
increasing client participation in democratic and economic institutions. See id. at
517-23.
Arrayed against arguments for client-centeredness are a number of counter-
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one conceptualizes that a client has something like a right of in-
formed consent with respect to important representational issues,
120
then attempting simultaneously to accommodate client goals and
competing social values necessarily creates contradictions and• •• 121
complexities. As a result of these contradictions in values, a criti-
cal perspective initially might lead to more careful selection of cli-
ents - the most moral decision that a lawyer makes. 122 Given that
lawyering is such a limited and specialized resource,123 a critical
perspective might result in more pro bono or institutional represen-
tation of poor clients and legal outsiders and less single-minded
representation of moneyed interests, white collar criminals, and
corporate hooligans (hyperbole intended).
Similarly, a critical legal perspective might necessitate more
moral dialogue with the client, both advantaged and disadvantaged
- a dialogue with unpredictable results, some justice-enhancing
and some justice-avoiding. 12 4 Nonetheless, more moral dialogue
arguments, most of which have a political or moral edge. One opponent urges
that lawyers in civil cases should decline to pursue legally sanctioned client goals if
such pursuit on balance would frustrate paramount goals ofjustice or fairness. See
id. at 556-57. A related, but tangential, attack on client-centeredness, challenges
the idea that lawyers may avoid moral respongibility for their lawyering activities in
pursuit of client goals. See id. at 560-61. At the very least, critics advocate the law-
yer's responsibility to raise moral issues in a nonmanipulative, nonpreemptive
manner, in other words to have a moral dialogue in which the lawyer and client
discuss moral issues. See id. at 561-64.
120. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent
and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41 (1979) (proposing an informed con-
sent model of lawyer-client decision-making).
121. See Hing, supra note 110, at 938-56 (describing lawyers who worked with
their clients to reduce interminority conflicts and adversarial strife in pursuit of a
goal of racial harmony); Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-
Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L.
REV. 213, 218-20 (1990) (discussing the probability of attorney-client conflict once
competing interests are raised); Richard D. Marsico, Working for Social Change and
Preserving Client Autonomy: Is There a Role for "Facilitative" Lawyering?, 1 CLINICAL L.
REV. 639, 650-63 (1995) (contrasting theories of client-centeredness and collabo-
rative lawyering and then suggesting a third alternative, facilitative lawyering);
Tremblay, supra note 110, at 48-60 (discussing contradictions, especially in poverty
law practice).
122. See Duncan Kennedy, The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their
Causes, 18 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1157, 1158 (1987); Simon, supra note 13, at 1083-84.
123. See Pepper, supra note 110, at 1546-48 (analyzing the extent to which
lawyers provide access to the complex legal environment through counseling).
124. See David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41
VAND. L. REV. 717, 737-38 (1988) (discussing client counseling as a negotiation
aimed at diverting clients from projects harmful to the common good); Simon,
supra note 13, at 1098-99; Tremblay, supra note 110, at 44 n.148; cf. Pepper, supra
note 110, 1546-54 (discussing how clients can use legal counseling to circumvent
[Vol. 23
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might reduce absolute client-centeredness and individualistic client
autonomy to set goals, even selfish goals, on self-defined terms.
Expanding the counseling dialogue might eventuate a changed
moral vision for the client and/or the lawyer. 2 5 In some cases, it
would be the client who changes his willingness to extract the last
pound of flesh from his opponents; in other cases, a moral dia-
logue might reveal new, more critical realities to the lawyer, even
the progressive lawyer, whose narrowness of experience has pre-
cluded exposure to or understanding of a client's lived experience.
Clients, however, are not the only source of constraint in de-
veloping a more critical discourse - the professional ideal of zeal-
ous advocacy itself can impede a transformative writing practice.
Forces arising from client representation, client perspective, client-
centeredness, attorney self-interest, the duty of zealous advocacy,
and rampant American individualism all combine to define a con-
text and cultural norm which pressure the lawyer to be "Machiavel-
lian" in choosing her discourse strategies. 26 Having been informed
about the lawful client goal, the lawyer is emboldened, in fact ex-
horted, to pursue that goal with all "lawful" discourse means. Un-
der this regimen of Machiavellianism, the choices that lawyers
make about the arguments they advance are determined primarily
by principles of instrumentalism and utilitarianism - the effective-
ness of the argument in persuading an actual, culturally biased de-
cision-maker to decide in the client's favor by all not-unlawful
means. Thus, the choice is rarely conceived of in terms of its ef-
fects on other parties or court participants, its non-outcome-
determinative impact on decision-makers, or its influence on soci-
ety-at-large or the corpus of law itself.
But the complexities of a critical discourse strategy go well be-
yond concerns about client selection, client counseling, and the
convention of zealous, Machiavellian advocacy. Assuming that le-
gal writers have reached appropriate moral judgments about which
clients to represent, that they have consulted with their clients
or violate the law and the moral and practice quandary this creates for their law-
yers).
125. Of course, even suggesting a moral dialogue with clients about legal
discourse, advocacy themes, and the content of legal arguments would require a
major change in legal writing pedagogy, since we currently disregard clients' right
of informed consent about the most traditional of discourse decisions. See Baker,
Implications for Research, Analysis, and Writing Programs, supra note 6, at 69-71.
126. See LuBAN, supra note 14, at 11-18; supra notes 110-21 and accompany-
ing text.
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about which law reform position to advance, and that they have re-
jected rank Machiavellianism, many discourse decisions remain.
Critical writers must ask themselves hard questions about the con-
tents and forms of legal writing that might spark legal and social
change. After all, critical writers are asking fully acculturated deci-
sion-makers, whose social status is closely associated with protecting
the interests of dominant forces in society and whose cognitive
heuristics ordinarily disfavor change, 27 to do an extraordinarily dif-
ficult thing - to expand and even transform their world view and to
initiate a rebellious social act. And to do so, the critical writer must
use discourse forms and content that are sufficiently familiar to the
decision-maker so that an imaginative leap might occur. What
words, written in what order, in whose voice, might prompt minor
social revolt among the judges, legislators, and others empowered
to make legal decisions?
C. Critical, Subversive Narrative as a Discourse Strategy
1. The Ubiquity and Contradictions of Narrative
Many critical legal scholars recommend subversive "outsider"
narrative or critical storytelling as a discourse strategy that con-
fronts power. 28 For multiple reasons, however, narrative as a pure
127. See HOWARD GARDNER, THE UNSCHOOLED MIND 171-72 (1991).
128. See, e.g., NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN
STORYrELLING AND THE LAW (David R. Papke ed., 1991); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing
the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Pov-
erty Law Practice: Learning the Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991);
Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 255, 259-80 (1994); Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1983); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law
Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and
Giving Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal
Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REv. 803 (1994); David Ray Papke, The Black Panther Party's
Narratives of Resistance, 18 VT. L. REV. 645 (1994); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive
Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning 87 MICH. L. REv.
2225 (1989).
Legal educators also increasingly discuss the use of narrative as a tool in
changing students' understanding. See, e.g., Nancy Cook, Legal Fictions: Clinical
Experiences, Lace Collars and Boundless Stories, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 41 (1994) (using
the evocative power of a fictional rape story and her client's multiple stories to
challenge traditional "theory of the case" pedagogy); Judith G. Greenberg & Rob-
ert V. Ward, Teaching Race and the Law Through Narrative, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
323 (1995) (using the Rodney King trials as the substance of a course to give stu-
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form is not necessarily a transformative genre. 129 To begin with,
narrative is the central constitutive'" and generative force in our
experience of the social world."" It is also the primary communica-
tive practice we use in our internal and external dialogue whereby
we attempt to explain our lives to ourselves and to share our reali-
ties with others.32 Narrative on a larger scale is used both to forge
dents a better understanding of contemporary racism); Joseph W. Singer, Persua-
sion, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2442 (1989) (using the threat of a flunk-out policy to teach
the realities of plant closings). Other, practice-based educators also emphasize
the importance of narrative in learning a trade or profession. See LAvE & WENGER,
supra note 49, at 108 ("For apprenticeship learning is supported by conversations
and stories about problematic and especially difficult cases."). "These stories,
then, are packages of situated knowledge.... To acquire a store of appropriate
stories, and, even more importantly, to know what are appropriate occasions for
telling them, is then part of what it means to become a midwife." Id.; see also
Baker, The Role of Context, Experience, Theory and Reflection in Ecological Learning su-
pra note 31, at 342-43 (discussing the use of familiar past situations as examples of
new, unfamiliar situations).
129. See Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self. Autobiographical Performances
in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REv. 1229, 1230-34 (1995) (presenting a sympa-
thetic but powerful critique of the transformative claims of outsider autobio-
graphical scholarship); Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 199-200; Cathy L. Mans-
field, Deconstructing Reconstructive Poverty Law: Practice-Based Critique of the
Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of Practice Movement, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 889, 928-
29 (1995) (challenging the transformative claims of outsider autobiographical
scholarship).
130. See Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 211 ("[Nlarratives are social practices,
part of the constitution of their own context. Because narratives are social prac-
tices that are constitutive of, not merely situated within, social contexts, they are as
likely to bear the imprint of dominant cultural meanings and relations of power as
any other social practice.").
131. See BRUNER, supra note 42, at 43, 67, 77; Baker, The Role of Context, Expe-
rience, Theory and Reflection in Ecological Learning, supra note 31, at 303-04; Ewick &
Silbey, supra note 94, at 198-99 (discussing how humans use eventfulness or narra-
tive as the principal cognitive strategy to make sense of the world); id. at 204 n.5
(discussing Ricoeur's analysis of narrativity) ("[N] arrative is not simply a construc-
tion of the author but something directly corresponding to lived human experi-
ence.").
132. See BRUNER, supra note 42, at 77, 111-15; Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94,
at 198-99. The success of narrative depends in substantial part on the empathy of
the listener. See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Clinic Runs Through It, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 65,
81-86 (1994). To counteract the dilemma of an "uncaring" lawyer or decision-
maker, Goldfarb emphasizes the importance of a listener being empathetic to the
resonance of narration, particularly to the submerged stories of subordinated
"others." See id. at 85-86. "[A person's] capacity for insight is a product of his
empathy. His empathy in turn is a product of his willingness to immerse himself
in other's pain. He feels another's anguish without losing his capacity to act on
his or her behalf." Id. at 81 (footnote omitted). Goldfarb continues:
The primary corrective for distorted projections of the world of others,
whether the source of the distortion lies in colonialism or in other forms
of hierarchy or separation, is found in the ability to listen intently to
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the "imperial" meta-narratives of the nation state and the more lo-
cal, more rebellious narratives of geographical, ethnic, or cultural
subcommunities.1, Accordingly, narrative, as a ubiquitous form of
discourse, has no special or unique salience.
Instead, narrative is produced in diverse social settings, includ-
ing legal ones, with a variety of purposes, audiences, and effects,'-
some progressive and some regressive. As a consequence of these
multiple purposes, audiences, and effects, narrative has no singular
valence of transformative meaning. "[There is no] single funda-
mental political purpose or psychological (or transcendental) ef-
fect of narratives, whether it be to reflect reality or to supplement
it, to reinforce ruling ideologies or to subvert them, to console us
for our mortality or to give us intimations of our immortality.",
3 5
Narratives are articulated within a cultural context where power
and resource imbalances abound and where conscious and uncon-
scious forces conspire to protect the status quo. Accordingly, many
narratives are hegemonic in that they represent, reinforce, and re-
those in social locations other than our own... to 'look[] to the bot-
tom.'
Id. at 79 (citing Marl J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987)). Goldfarb professes that
finely-tuned, empathetic attention to stories activates both our moral intuitions
and our emotions. See id. at 67. Contact with the detailed particulars of the lives
of others helps move "us beyond the boundaries of our parochial lives, helping us
feel and consider a wider range of possibilities than we would otherwise identify,
and rendering us more willing to be touched by life's complexity and variety, mys-
tery and uncertainty." Id.
133. Rebecca R. French, Review Essay: Of Narrative in Law and Anthropology,
30 LAw& Soc'Y REV. 417, 422-23 (1996) (reviewing NARRATivE, VIOLENCE, AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1993)).
134. See Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 206 ("[S] tories are always told
within particular historical, institutional, and interactional contexts that shape
their telling, its meanings and effects. They are told with particular interest, mo-
tives, and purposes in mind. Furthermore, stories are constrained by both rules
of performance and norms of content.").
135. Id. at 205 (citing Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Narrative Versions, Narrative
Theories, 7 CRrnCAL INQUIRY 213, 235 (1980)). Winter describes the polyglot and
routine use of narrative strategies as follows:
The narrator does not tell his or her story from the raw, unmediated
date of life, but rather assembles and makes use of the preexisting cul-
tural ICMs [idealized cognitive models] with which he or she appre-
hends the world. The narrator then configures these nuclei to form a
recognizable story-pattern with an apprehensible meaning. By the time
the reader confronts the story, the original experiences and ideas have
been twice rendered and shaped by cultural and narrative forms.
Winter, supra note 128, at 2252. "We can think of the effective legal story-teller as
one who 'retails' cultural knowledge from the stock of practices produced by the
culture at the 'wholesale' level." Id. at 2270.
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produce the existing social order.3 6 The well-told tales of "welfare
cheats," "welfare dependency," "teenage pregnancies," and "unwed
mothers" (and other political parables) do much to create a social
world in which newborns and their mothers might be denied food,
shelter, and clothing.3 7 "Constituent and distinctive features of
narratives make them particularly potent forms of social control
and ideological penetration and homogenization.... Performative
features of narrative such as repetition, vivid concrete details, par-
ticularity of characters, and coherence of plot silence epistemo-
logical challenges and often generate emotional identification and
commitment."38
The individualism of personal narratives also undermines their
subversive potential. Contrary to many of its claims, 3 9 outsider nar-
rative frequently requires the storyteller to reproduce a liberal,
autonomous self "that culture already has prepared for 
her."' 40
Thus, for Coughlin, narrative "texts describe the individual self, its
material needs, and psychological desires as central concerns of
law.
,, 4'
Precisely because it appeals to readers' fascination with
136. See Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 212. The authors observe:
Because of the conventionalized character of narrative, then, our stories
are likely to express ideological effects and hegemonic assumptions. We
are as likely to be shackled by the stories we tell (or that are culturally
available for our telling) as we are by the form of oppression they might
seek to reveal. In short, the structure, the content, and the performance
of stories as they are defined and regulated within social settings often
articulate and reproduce existing ideologies and hegemonic relations of
power and inequality.
Id.; see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Es-
say on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 849 (1993) (arguing that narrative
per se is not always transformative because it must always relate to an aspect of in-
sider experience).
137. See Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Dis-
course Informs the Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1189-95
(1995).
138. Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 214.
139. See Coughlin, supra note 129, at 1248-51 (cataloguing the liberatory
claims of outsider scholarship).
140. Id. at 1251. Although Coughlin primarily discusses outsider, academic
autobiography, her concerns are applicable to other outsider narratives, including
those which might be produced by practicing lawyers on behalf of outsider cli-
ents. See id. at 1338.
141. Id. at 1252. "Individual narratives ... allow for decontextualization, a
shift to the 'single cell' which loses the larger social and political context."
French, supra note 133, at 417 (discussing Lawrence Stone, The Revival of Narra-
tive: Reflections on a New Old History, 85 PAST & PRESENT 3 (1979)).
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the self-sufficiency, resiliency and uniqueness of the to-
temic individual privileged by liberal political theory,
there is a risk that autobiographical [or other outsider
narrative] discourse is a fallible, even co-opted, instru-
ment for the social reforms envisioned by the outsid-
ers .... [O]utsider autobiographies unwittingly deflect
attention from collective social responsibility and thwart
the development of collective solutions for the eradica-
tion of racist and sexist harms.
142
According to Coughlin, not only must outsider narrative con-
form in structure to dominant templates of self and of a life well-
lived, this same narrative necessarily privileges the individual over
the group - personal need over communal justice. This individual-
istic tendency of narrative is exacerbated by the litigation process,
which typically requires individual stories rather than collective
ones.
In fact, given the ideological commitment to individual-
ized justice and case-by-case processing that characterizes
our legal system, narrative, relying as it often does on the
language of the particular and subjective, may more often
operate to sustain, rather than subvert, inequality and in-
justice. The law's insistent demand for personal narra-
tives achieves a kind of radical individuation that disem-
powers the teller by effacing the connections among
persons and the social organization [indeed orchestra-
tion] of their experiences.
4
2. Subversive Content and Outsider Voice in Critical Narrative
As a result of this analysis of narrative's multiple and conflict-
ing usages and possibilities, critical legal writers must do more than
simply import the distinctive discursive features of narrative - selec-
tion of characters and events, temporal ordering, and emplotment
of conflict and closure T44- to create "critical" narratives. They must
discover and select those aspects of a particular narrative which
142. Coughlin, supra note 129, at 1285-86.
143. Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 217.
144. See id. at 200. Although there is disagreement about what exactly con-
stitutes a narrative, narrative as a genre typically employs three features: (1) "se-
lective appropriation of past events and characters," (2) temporal ordering with a
beginning, a middle, and an end, and (3) emplotment - an "overarching struc-
ture, often in the context of an opposition or struggle.... [to] ensure both 'nar-
rative closure' and 'narrative causality.'" Id.
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might make it subversive or critical rather than hegemonic.'45
Ewick and Silbey have described a sociology of narrative identifying
two features which might make a narrative truly subversive: (1)
juxtaposing the individual and collective content in a story and (2)
using outsiders' direct reports.'4 Each of these features, however,
raises special difficulties for legal writers writing in typical practice
settings to traditional legal audiences.
In terms of content, "subversive stories are those that employ
those connections [between the particular and the general], mak-
ing manifest the relationship between.., biography and history."
1 47
"[S] ubversive stories recount particular experiences as rooted in and
part of an encompassing cultural, material, and political world that
extends beyond the local.' ' 148 Coughlin argues that non-subversive
narratives reinforce key tenets of mainstream ideology. 149 In doing
so, non-subversive narratives privilege the individual over the
group by trying to "escape" stereotypes rather than destroy them. °
In contrast, truly subversive stories explode stereotypes and particu-
larize group injustice by challenging myths that confine and de-
form. "They shock and enlighten precisely because they juxtapose
the particular and private with the legal abstractions that are sup-
posed to contain them."151 "If narratives instantiate power to the
degree that they regulate silence and colonize consciousness, sub-
versive stories are those that break that silence."'52 Lucie White's
now classic story of Mrs. G.'s rebellious testimony that Sunday
shoes were "necessities" in her world, no matter how impoverished,
is a prototypical example of how a particular story confronted, re-
vealed, and unsettled the classic welfare concept of basic necessities
used to deny dignity and vital resources to welfare recipients.
153
145. "Subversive stories" are those "which defy and at times politically trans-
form" hegemonic practices. Id. at 217.
146. See Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 219, 221-23.
147. Id. at 218 (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 219.
149. See Coughlin, supra note 129, at 1292-1302 (discussing the scholarship
ofJerome Culp, who argues that while all black scholars possess a black voice, only
those who espouse opposition to racial oppression possess a black perspective).
150. See id.
151. Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 219.
152. Id. at 220.
153. See Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Burr. L. REv. 1 (1990) (recounting the
story of Mrs. G.). Mrs. G. was a 35-year-old, African American, single mother of
five girls, living on AFDC. See id. at 21. After receiving a lump-sum insurance set-
tlement for an automobile accident, Mrs. G.'s AFDC worker told her she was free
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A subversive story, like Mrs. G.'s, might be most critical or
transformative if it convinces not only that it is unique, but that it is
exemplary of a shared social problem that calls for redress. Mrs.
G.'s story suggests the existence of many similar stories. Since it
addresses the phenomenology of oppression concretely and gen-
erically, this story elicits an empathetic response by appealing to
the moral sensibilities of a welfare worker.1 54 According to Cough-
lin's critique, however, one still could wonder if the outcome and
the message of Lucie White's article is not primarily about the tri-
umph of the autonomous, heroic welfare recipient who overcame
both her lawyer and the welfare system. 155 Moreover, what if Mrs.
G. had not been a religious Christian in the deep South, thereby
conforming to a privileged cultural identity? 56 What if she instead
had been buying Nike sneakers to increase her children's social
status on the street - would her story end in the same triumph? Is
there a better story, yet untold, about multiple welfare recipients
fighting collectively to change the allotment category - is there ul-
timately a better, more collective, more subversive story to be told?
As exemplified by Mrs. G., there is a danger in over-
romanticizing and over-essentializing the stories of outsiders, even
if they have a privileged knowledge of oppression. Clearly, every
outsider can tell "a story" - every outsider can tell many stories. 157
to spend the money and it would not affect her benefits. See id. at 24. After a
random audit of her AFDC file revealed the existence of this insurance payment,
Mrs. G. was ordered to repay that amount which was considered an overpayment
by AFDC. See id. In an attempt to dismiss the repayment order, Mrs. G.'s lawyer
opted against using an estoppel argument, in favor of arguing that Mrs. G. spent
the money on necessities, which would exempt her from the order. See id. at 28-
30. When testifying Mrs. G. stated she used the money to buy new Sunday shoes
for her girls. See id. at 31. Although she lost the hearing, the county dismissed the
repayment order, determining that it would not be "fair" to make her repay the
amount. See id. at 32. Ewick and Silbey discuss Mrs. G.'s story as a subversive pro-
totype. See Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 218.
154. See Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern
Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 145, 209 (1985) ("The narrative in legal theory, like
all narrative, brings us face to face with our moral selves, our moral options and
our capacity for moral action.").
155. See Coughlin, supra note 119, at 1299.
156. See Mansfield, supra note 129, at 916.
157. See id. at 906. Mansfield writes:
As with all individuals, poverty law clients tell their stories in different
settings for different reasons .... In each setting, the client may distill
the story [differently] in furtherance of the purpose for which the story
is being told. Over time, the client's own understanding of his or her
story may change and transform.
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All we have to do is look at the stories told by Clarence Thomas,
Louis Farrakhan, Spike Lee, and Derrick Bell to see that they may
tell radically different, even oppositional stories. Is each story
"true"? Is each story "representative" of a shared experience of the
world? Should each story be left unchallenged? Decidedly, not
so.158 Perhaps each story must be told, perhaps each story must be
heard, but each story must in turn be judged (or interpreted) on
its merits.
The [stories of the] oppressed do not have intrinsic values
simply by the fact of their membership in an oppressed
group. What they do have is a strong political claim to be
heard: [V]ictims are entitled to insist on others' attention
not because they can offer virtue to a fallen world, but be-
cause they are experts on their own lives. 5 9
Articulating a critical narrative - producing one in the first
place - ordinarily is empowered if the narrator has an opportunity
to share her story with others similarly situated. Mutual dialogue
around common social content is the social process that helps elicit
and reveal "the collective organization of personal life." 160 Feminist
consciousness-raising groups are a contemporary example of this
phenomenon. They show that the best way to discover the com-
158. Coughlin in particular rejects the claim that narrative must be exempt
from critical reaction. See Coughlin, supra note 129, at 1281-82. She asserts:
By rejecting any critical reaction as a treacherous failure of sympathy for
the author's [or protagonist's] pain, if not as the product of prejudiced
ignorance, and by dismissing criticism as a personal attack on the
author's character, autobiographical rhetoric is no less coercive of read-
ers than the legal rhetoric that the outsiders desire to supersede.
Id. Exercising her power of critique, Coughlin challenges the autobiographical
forms and tropes of several prominent outsider legal scholars including Jerome
Culp, Patricia Williams, Richard Delgado, and Robin West. See id. at 1292-1338
(stating that the authors' unreflective storytelling promotes mainstream ideals
which conflict with the very tenets of discourse they claim to advocate).
159. Allan C. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1173, 1213 (1992); see also Peter Halewood, White Men Can't Jump:
Critical Epistemologies, Embodiment, and the Praxis of Legal Scholarship, 7 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1, 24 (1995) ("[T] he perspectives of the oppressed are not a sure source
of wisdom; the 'false consciousness' of oppressed groups is a real problem: 'sub-
ordination can obscure as well as illuminate self-knowledge.'" (citation omitted)).
160. Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 221; cf. French, supra note 133, at 422
(discussing Robert Cover's idea of a "paideic," small community narrative that en-
compasses a normative view of what is and what might be); Charles R. Lawrence,
III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 819, 839-42 (1995) (describing the need of a "homeplace" for outsider
communities for material support, strategizing, and storytelling).
161. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
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munal content of stories of oppression is to share them with others
and then to discern their common themes. 16 Typically, however,
lawyers have limited opportunity to support "consciousness-raising"
groups in their conference rooms or otherwise. 163 The predomi-
nance of individual representation, the ethos of zealous advocacy,
and rules about confidentiality conspire to limit lawyers' ability to
aggregate clients so they can share critical narratives.
In addition to revealing a collective wrong, the way the story is
told and by whom may be critically important to its transformative
potential. There may be a particular value in having the outsider
client tell the story directly because social marginality might be a
necessary condition of the story's subversive impact.6 Paradoxi-
cally, this preference for an actual outsider voice creates special
complications for legal writers who ordinarily must "represent"
their client in their writing. Even when lawyers use their most hu-
165man voice, or when they most effectively convey the "unedited"
version of their client's story, the subversive element might be lost
in transmission. To say it differently, having a socially powerful
lawyer retell (and usually recast) the story of a marginal outsider




163. But see Naomi R. Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 1, 8-12 (1991) (describing the important collaborative aspects of feminist liti-
gation); Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of
a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1605 (1989) (detailing the problem-
solving meeting between a lawyer and her client); Lucie E. White, Collaborative
Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L.
REV. 157, 160 (1994) (advocating the use of legal scholarly projects in order to
develop collaborating lawyering environments); Lucie E. White, To Learn and
Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699, 700
(illustrating how a lawyer and a social worker were instrumental in reshaping local
government in South Africa).
164. See Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 220.
165. See Elizabeth Perry Hodges, Writing in a Different Voice, 66 TEX. L. REV.
629 (1988). Elizabeth Hodges views the problem of developing a critical dis-
course strategy as one of developing a more "human" professional voice. See id. at
630 ("Can one unfreeze, so to speak, the professional voice and liberate its elu-
sive, protean, 'human' relative?"); see also Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40
STAN. L. REV. 869, 872-73 (1988) (discussing discourse strategies based on the
character of speaker/writer and the need to construct a trustworthy communica-
tive self to establish moral authority with one's audience).
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3. Meeting Adverse Audience Expectations and the Dogma of Legal
Narratives
As frustrating and difficult as it might be to get a client's story
heard at all, given institutional barriers to its production and ar-
ticulation, the much greater dilemma relates to the incommen-
surability of outsider narrative and expectations of a traditional le-
gal audience.166 To put it mildly, the typical expectations, indeed
the dogmatic demands, of the traditional legal decision-maker dis-
favor outsider narrative in lieu of insider tales and rules. 167 The
problem here is not that a lawyer and her client might not have a
critical, counter-hegemonic consciousness themselves and a sub-
versive story to tell, but that both the lawyer and the client might
have difficulty in making this unfamiliar, perhaps unwelcome, per-
spective cognizable to a legal audience."" In law as elsewhere,
"[t]he content of narratives is... governed by social norms and
conventions. Content rules, as they operate within different cul-
tural and institutional settings, define what constitutes an appropri-
ate or successful narrative. They define intelligibility, relevance,
and believability, while specifying what serves as validating re-
sponses or critical rejection." 9
In many important respects, law dictates, excludes, and con-
fines the narrative content of legal discourse, especially when it re-
quires that a client story reproduce or conform to the narrative
structures of existing legal paradigms. Law, especially common
law, does not eschew narrative - it embraces legally sanctioned nar-
rative accounts, master stories which are hegemonic in expressing
166. See Ewick & Sibley, supra note 94, at 207 (discussing appropriate con-
tent contained in successful legal narrative).
167. See id. at 208 (describing how judges strongly influence the stories in
court by determining evidential relevance, length of witness testimony, and the
type of information allowed into the witness' story).
168. See id. at 207-11 (illustrating the importance of a sound legal narrative
and its influence on legal audiences).
169. Id. at 207. See generally Gilkerson, supra note 128, at 914-15 (arguing
that poverty law lawyers must be sensitive and articulate); Carolyn Heilbrun & Ju-
dith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913, 1914
(1990) (stating that lawyering for the poor can be an activity of generating narra-
tives that illuminate, create, and reflect normative worlds and that bring impover-
ished experiences that might otherwise be invisible and silent into public view).
Comprehension problems can of course affect lawyers as well as judges. See Clark
D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MIcH.
L. REV. 2459, 2463-69 (1989) (discussing the impact on clients of lawyers who in-
sist on their own methods of interpretation).
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the cultural/social/legal relations which maintain power.7 ° Thus,
there are fundamental tensions between privileging client voice,
encouraging direct client participation, presenting the subversive
social content of individual stories, and translating client stories to
make them more plausible and credible to establishment decision-
makers.' In this process of representation and translation, the dis-
sident voices and subversive traces in a narrative and the evocative
particularities of an individual story might be suppressed and com-
pressed within the conventionalized and homogenized story lines
of law.
72
170. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 3, at 199 (discussing the "prototypical nar-
ratives at the heart of a discourse that is explicitly hostile to narrative"); David Ray
Papke, Discharge as Denouncement: Appreciating the Storytelling of Appellate Opinions,
40J. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 147-54 (1990) (discussing legal master narratives in general
and in bankruptcy cases in particular); Elizabeth Tobin, Imagining the Mother's
Text: Toni Morrison's Beloved and Contemporary Law, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 233
(1993) (discussing narrative accounts of mothers in four recent cases, each of
which illustrates the problematic nature of representing the experience of moth-
erhood).
171. See Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 208. "[T]o the degree that the
narrative presented by a litigant or witness fails to provide the logical connections
demanded by the developing plot and conventionalized norms for sequence, mo-
tive, and the like, the audience will supply those normative connections" and in
the process either accept or reject the plausibility and justiciability of the narrative
presented. Id.; see also Baron, supra note 128, at 264 ("Law's stories are highly
structured by substantive principles that render irrelevant much 'ordinary' infor-
mation.... Just as the law recognizes only limited kinds of stories, law also rec-
ognizes only limited ways of telling stories."); Coughlin, supra note 129, at 1287
("The autobiographer who desires a material benefit from her performance must
adopt a persona that is intelligible, if not enticing, to her audience."); William M.
O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims
Court Narratives, 19 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 661, 698 (1985) ("[T]he law imposes highly
specific requirements on narratives."); White, supra note 153, at 17 (stating that
"[l]itigants who use a relational framework do poorly in court because the logic of
their stories clashes with the rule - breach - injury logic in which judges have
learned to conceptualize legal claims").
Some commentators do not regret the attorney's obligation to translate and
to impose legal narrative structure on a client's story. See Mansfield, supra note
129, at 900. Mansfield states:
If the poverty lawyer does not take an interpretive editorial role in the
presentation of the client's story through the imposition of legal con-
struct upon it, utilitarian control over the story is forfeited to other enti-
ties, such as the tribunal or the opposing attorney, neither of whom is as
closely affiliated with the client's interests as the poverty lawyer.
Id.; see also Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in
Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REv. 485, 524-29 (1994).
172. See Ewick & Silbey, supra note 94, at 208; Britt et al., supra note 6, at 15.
In an effect called homogenizing, "[e]xperiences are translated into already rec-
ognized legal categories, so that differences between individuals and groups are
[Vol. 23
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Likewise, and in addition to contradictions between the ur-
gency of outsider narrative and the hegemony of legal master sto-
ries and categories, there are tensions between the legal system's
emphasis on "truthful" stories about "what really happened" and
outsider narrative's offer of "perspective" stories that give the audi-
ence new vantage points from which to view the uncertain world.
73
Even though the "what really happened" story is undoubtedly a
partial fiction in and of itself,74 being "truthful" is part of a lawyer's
ethical obligation to the court 17 and of a client autobiographer's
implicit contract with her audience. 176 However, by accepting an
emphasis on truthfulness, the lawyer at least partially reinforces a
foundational view of the world that "actual" events happen and that
"objective" reports can convey those events "accurately.' 77 Perspec-
tive stories from outsiders, on the other hand, may challenge
power to the extent they help reveal the unacknowledged vantage
point of the culturally favored party and of the decision-maker.
7 8
Towards this end, stories emphasizing point-of-view might choose
to focus on the shared but socially significant perspective of a par-
ticular client - for example, what it is like to wait for an abusive
partner to come home for dinner. Alternatively, the perspective
story might not simply suggest the moral primacy of a previously
suppressed perspective, but suggest that there are "many realities"
in the interpretable universe. 179 Both of the above uses of point-of-
view perspective expand the possibility of empathetic alliances with
those whose vantage points and experiences are too often ignored




173. See Baron, supra note 128, at 280-85.
174. See id. Since narrative, too, is a constructive medium that utilizes selec-
tive appropriation of characters, events, and dramatic tensions, it is impossible to
find a single truthful narrative account, though there may be many which would
be plainly false.
175. See supra note 112.
176. See Coughlin, supra note 129, at 1269-73 (discussing an autobiogra-
pher's implicit promise to represent real events and experiences).
177. See Baron, supra note 128, at 280-83.
178. See id. at 283-85; Johnson, supra note 128, at 832-842 (analyzing the use
of narratives within the voice-of-color context); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword:
Telling Stories, 87 MiCH. L. REv. 2073, 2082 (1989). People of varying social status
and experiences often see events in distinct and differing ways. See id.
179. See Baron, supra note 128, at 284; Johnson, supra note 128, at 832-37.
180. A more radical viewpoint on perspective suggests that the reason to ac-
cept and acknowledge outsider perspectives is not merely to demonstrate good
discourse manners or to enrich pluralistic, democratic decision-making. Instead,
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4. Strategies for Using Critical, Subversive Narrative in Practice-
Based Writing
When resolving these tensions about subversive content, client
voice, legal viability, narrative truth, and social perspective - in
pursuing a more critical narrative discourse - a legal writer might
ultimately choose to use "outsider" narratives. If she does, where
should she use them? One possibility is to plead her case differ-
ently, eschewing the conventional format and stylistic prose of tra-
ditional complaints for a more contextual narrative - a so-called
"thicker" pleading, told situationally and from a point of view
about the unfolding of a life and the social events and dilemmas of
that life.1 8 1 Similarly, lawyers might choose to loosen the shackles
of "objective" fact-telling in their legal memoranda and briefs and
develop a more textured, point-of-view narrative to narrow the em-
pathetic gap between client and reader.18 Those point-of-view nar-
according to this "positionality" perspective, knowledge itself is radically identity-
based, experiential, and situational, and thus the discourse of outsiders is the only
reliable report of their oppression. See Halewood, supra note 159, at 19-25. "[I]n
an epistemological world populated by multiple forms of consciousness, 'white
men can'tjump'" - they can't "know" the realities of oppression despite their best
efforts and intentions. Id. at 6. "[K]nowledge of the mechanisms of subordina-
tion can best be gained from below, that is, by those occupying a subjugated social
location, by those who embody subjugation." Id. at 20; see also Matsuda, supra note
132, at 324-26.
To credit this balkanization of identity epistemologies would be severely to
doubt the ability of legal decision-makers to empathize with, comprehend, and
credit the perspective of outsiders. See Halewood, supra note 159, at 10. "Because
the distance between white male scholars [and judges] and oppression is experi-
ential [and epistemic], empathy and good intentions on the part of such scholars
[and judges] are not sufficient to bridge it." Id.; see also James M. O'Fallon &
Cheyney C. Ryan, Finding a Voice, Giving an Ear: Reflections of Masters/Slaves,
Men/Women, 24 GA. L. REV. 883, 893 (1990) ("Good intentions alone cannot dis-
solve the institutionalized deafness that constitutes [male] ideology."). Under
these circumstances, "the best scholars, [lawyers, or judges] can hope for is to
work together and to combine perspective, each contributing to an improved pic-
ture of the social whole." Halewood, supra note 159, at 7. This epistemological
fragmentation might work for scholarly discourse, the true subject of Halewood's
analysis, but it doesn't hold much promise for critical discourse aimed at convinc-
ing deeply conservative legal audiences and decision-makers. In the real world,
we must hope for the possibility of empathy and partial sharing of vicarious reali-
ties.
181. See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil
Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 808-33 (1995) (suggesting that civil rights litiga-
tors consider drafting pleadings with elements such as drama, client narrative,
metaphor, irony, poetry, homilies, oxymorons, the free word, the lawyer's own
voice, and jazz).
182. Some feminist briefs, especially amicus briefs, have collected individual
stories from many women in an effort to show both the individuality and the rep-
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ratives might be strengthened by blending cinemagraphic themes
or other cultural narratives in their factual matrix,' as long as they
are progressive instead of regressive. Likewise, the structure of
narrative might provide more of the thematic structure of the "le-
gal" argument section itself, so that doctrine and precedent are
blended within a system of narrative coherence that calls for jus-
tice.
Relying on and yet confronting narrative structures by which
jurors, judges, and other decision-makers understand the world,
8 4
lawyers also might construct more critical stories which challenge
the prevailing master stories of race and gender 5 in favor of trans-
formative, subversive stories of rebellion, redress, liberation, and
equality. The welfare mother becomes a conscientious parent for-
saking work outside the home in favor of important child-rearing
work inside the home. l8 6 A dangerous Black youth becomes a bas-
ketball player, a struggling but increasingly successful student who
resentativeness of women's experiences of oppression. See, e.g., Ruth Colker,
Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron? - A Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 137, 170-71 (1990) (pro-
viding extensive testimony from women who had abortions); Sarah E. Bums, Notes
from the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 198 (1990)
(describing a speak-out brief summarizing personal accounts from 40,000
women); Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Method, 16 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 373, 393-94 (1991) (discussing Martha Minow's use of short statements
from 36 pro-choice religious groups); Lynn M. Paltrow, Amicus Brief: Richard
Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 9 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 3, 12-24 (1986) (containing over 40 women's experiences with legal,
illegal, or unavailable abortions).
183. See Philip N. Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic Influences upon a De-
fendant's Closing Argument to a Jury, 18 VT. L. REV. 721, 740-46 (1994) (discussing,
organizing and presenting closing argument with themes and style of screenplay).
184. See generally INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION
MAKING (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (introducing the major themes ofjuror decision-
making and the research that has been conducted to evaluate their reality).
185. See generally RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER (Toni Morrison
ed., 1992) (analyzing Anita Hill's accusations of sexual harassment in a racially
charged context); Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The
Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1992)
(also analyzing Anita Hill's accusations of sexual harassment); Lisa C. Ikemoto,
Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean American Conflict:
How We Constructed "Los Angeles, "66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1993) (describing racial
master stories and their effects on cross-cultural conflict between communities of
color).
186. See generally JILL DUERR BERRICK, FACES OF POVER': PORTRAITS OF
WOMEN AND CHILDREN ON WELFARE 6-9 (1995) (giving an historical account of the
transformation of the popular stereotype of the welfare mother from that of the
deserving poor who should be encouraged and helped to stay at home with their
children, to that of the undeserving, freeloading poor with questionable morals).
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helps to support his family.17 Even transformative stories, however,
must satisfy culturally primed longing for coherence, comprehen-
sibility, and plausibility. 8
D. Detecting, Avoiding, and Confronting Appeals to Bias
Another critical discourse strategy, whether using narrative or
not, tackles the dilemma of ubiquitous bias. First, to address the
dilemma of bias at all, the legal writer must learn how to diagnose
both direct and indirect appeals to bias, not only in one's own writ-
ing but in the writing of others.8 9 What tropes of language, rhe-
torical flourishes, codes, metaphors, and symbols catalyze latent
cognitive and emotional bias, and how do they do so? Second, in
her "offensive" strategy "against" the other side, the advocate must
weigh the value of making "persuasive" appeals to the negative bi-
ases of readers against the countervailing value of avoiding such
appeals to culturally primed inheritances of classism, racism, sex-
ism, and homophobia.' 9° Third, in her "defensive" strategy, in
characterizing and recharacterizing her own client, the advocate
must figure out how to successfully counteract overt and covert ap-
peals to the biases of decision-makers.'9' She must do so in a legal
regime which, as a matter of color-blind formalism, says that bias
(and counterbias) has no place whatsoever, at the same time that
there is routine tolerance of rampant appeals to bias. Fourth, not
only must the advocate accurately detect corrosive discourse strate-
gies aimed at her client, she also must consider whether to respond
with counterappeals to "positive" bias, e.g., victim status or valor-
187. See generally ALEX KoTLowrrz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE (1991)
(chronicling the lives of two boys who grew up in a Chicago housing project).
188. See Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Neces-
sity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REv. 39, 72-74 (1994). Professor Sherwin makes
a passionate and deeply sophisticated argument for what he calls affirmative
postmodern storytelling. See id. at 72-80. Rejecting the simplicities of traditional
linear storylines and the nihilism of postmodern narrative implosion, Sherwin
suggests that affirmative postmodern storytellers embrace multiplicity and com-
plexities of details at the same time that they meet their audience's expectations
of a shared cultural narrative. See id. "For the affirmative postmodern story to
work.... there must be a coherent storyline to cling to." Id. at 77. Although
many culturally sanctioned stories are structured by existing power relationships
and inequalities, other familiar stories evidence resistance, egalitarianism, and al-
truism.
189. See infra Part III.D.14.
190. See infra notes 193-223 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 224-233 and accompanying text.
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ized identity.19 If these responses are inappropriate, the advocate
must discover other, more effective countermeasures that help to
level the discursive playing field.
1. The Ubiquity of Cognitive Bias and Social Stereotypes
Human action and language is organized around the efficien-
cies of cognitive bias - quick decisions based on scant evidence. 193
Some of this bias is organized to support existing systems of pur-
poseful oppression, like racism, but the central core of cognitive
bias is simply organized around the prototype, narrative, and cate-
gorical forms of subconscious reasoning that all of us must use to
navigate the physical and social world.1" Unfortunately, from the
earliest age, most of us learn a robust repertoire of negative social
stereotypes.9 Some of these stereotypes become crystallized into a
set of ideological commitments, and a system of purposeful dis-
crimination and oppression, like white supremacy,1
96 patriarchy,' 97
192. See infra notes 239-249 and accompanying text.
193. See Baker, The Role of Context, Experience, Theory, and Reflection in Ecologi-
cal Learning, supra note 31, at 310-13.
194. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
ExCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAw (1990) (offering an extensive analysis of the "di-
lemma of difference" - the pervasiveness of categorization/difference-making,
especially in the context of systems of oppression); Jody Armour, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733,
750-59 (1995) (discussing how automatic, culturally imposed responses to out-
sider groups can by counteracted by activating conscious, egalitarian belief sys-
tems and other self-monitoring practices); Jay Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classi-
fication, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 696-705 (1989) (describing our recurrent use of
cognitive paradigms); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161, 1166-1217 (1995) (analyzing how discriminatory employment deci-
sions usually result from a variety of unintentional categorization and inference-
building errors which characterize routine human cognition); Charles R. Law-
rence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322-44 (1987) (discussing the prevalence and persistence of
subconscious racism and concluding "we are all racists"); Steven L. Winter, Tran-
scendental Nonsense, Metaphorical Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1105, 1114-59 (1989) (discussing experientialist cognition and ideal-
ized cognitive models which help explain the efficiencies of cognitive shortcuts).
195. See Armour, supra note 194, at 741-42 n.34 (reporting research that
children learn negative associations - stereotypes - by the age of three to four,
well before they have the cognitive skills to counteract them). Once humans gain
any basis for a group identity, they seem immediately to attribute favorable fea-
tures to in-group members and negative features to out-group members. See
Krieger, supra note 194, at 1191-93.
196. For a powerful account of how whites, even poor whites, participated in
constructing an ideology of racial supremacy, see DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES
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and heterosexism. 99 These clearly articulated ideological preju-
dices certainly have found their way into courtrooms, legal texts, 99
and our political discourse. More frequently, however, these
childhood stereotypes are reinforced, or culturally primed, repeat-
edly until they become habitual, and therefore unconscious, parts
of our mental processes. 00 From the shrouded depths of our sub-
consciousness, these well-structured systems of "white" magic fre-
quently overcome our more conscious commitments to egalitarian-
iSM201ism.
2°
In order to activate a stereotype's negative bias component,
humans are not limited to direct appeals to pejorative terms and
ideologies of superiority. Instead, code words, associated secon-
dary attributes, and other metonymic devices can activate latent,
subconscious prejudice.2 02  The concept of metonymy - the part
evokes the whole - is particularly powerful in elucidating the cogni-
tive processes of bias. First, metonymy describes how the whole
group can be tarnished by the negative behavioral and attitudinal
features of particular group members.02 In essence, the negative
OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991).
197. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 161 (investigating how stereotypes and
social power shape a patriarchical society).
198. See, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytel-
ling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 511, 607-33 (1992).
199. See, for example, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872), and Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), for only
the briefest sampling of grotesque stereotypes opined at the level of Supreme
Court decisions.
200. See Armour, supra note 194, at 750-59. Not only are these prejudices
frequently "primed" by an elaborate array of nearly invisible, immediate cultural
messages, they also have become habituated as "chronically accessible social con-
structs." John A. Bargh, Does Subliminality Matter to Social Psychology? Awareness of
the Stimulus Versus Awareness of Its Influence, in PERCEPTION WrrIHOUT AWARENESS:
COGNITIVE, CLINICAL, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 236, 242 (Robert F. Bornstein &
Thane S. Pittman eds., 1992) (emphasis omitted). We subconsciously "call on"
these primings and chronic cultural constructs when interpreting otherwise am-
biguous social situations. See id. at 242-43. For example, in one set of experi-
ments, "an ambiguously aggressive act was seen as more hostile when performed
by an African-American than when a white was the perpetrator - and this was true
of both African-American as well as white perceivers." Id. at 243-44.
201. See Armour, supra note 194, at 739. Under the pressure of civil rights
activists and other ideologies of equality, most Americans subscribe to a conscious
system of racial equality. See id.
202. See Winter, supra note 194, at 1149-50. According to Steven Winter,
some of our most common cognitive models make use of metonymy, where refer-
ence to a salient part calls forth the whole. See id.
203. See Winter, supra note 128, at 2234 n.32. "What occurs in the case of
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feature of an individual is considered to be representative - it is
generalized to be characteristic of the entire, now despised social
group.204 Thus, the first form of metonymy, the negative exemplar
(e.g., a youth gang member), comes to epitomize the whole out-
sider group (youth of color).
Another form of cognitive metonymy is even more insidious.
Here a single element or symbolic representation of a stereotype
can elicit the entire negative schema and aversive reaction.2 0 5 Thus,
describing Bernard Goetz's victims as "predatory"2 6 or describing
Rodney King as "uncontrollable"207 conjures the aggregating stereo-
stereotypes is that attributes which are experienced with respect to some members
of a social group are ascribed to all. Stereotypes are metonymies because the ex-
perientially grounded part (the attributes of some) come to stand for the whole
(the entire social group)." Id. (emphasis omitted). One explanation for the ex-
cessive weight given to the negative exemplar is that it is more salient and thus
more memorable. See Krieger, supra note 194, at 1193-95.
204. See R. NISSBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIALJUDGMENT 18 (1980) (describing two of the most domi-
nant cognitive biases - the representativeness and availability heuristics used to
classify and compare events and people). The use of these heuristics is "generally
automatic and nonreflective and notably free of any conscious consideration of
appropriateness." Id. The representativeness heuristic helps us reach quick
judgments, but according to old categories. See id. at 24-28. Thus, bias persists
through selective attention, cognitive inertia, and belief perseverance. See
Krieger, supra note 194, at 1199-1211 (discussing how cognitive stereotypes
"cause" discrimination, particularly through processing errors of representative-
ness, salience, and schema activation).
205. See Armour, supra note 194, at 758. "[I]t seems that the black stereo-
type must be constructed cognitively in such a way that activating one component
of the stereotype simultaneously primes or activates the remaining closely associ-
ated components as well." Id. Armour speculates that cognitive psychologists'
theory of associative network - of connected, mutually reinforced neural pathways
- helps explain this cognitive process. See id. at 758-59 n.122. Krieger refers to
this brand of cognitive metonymy as one of "illusory correlation" where there is a
subjective impression of a strong correlation between group membership and a
particular trait. Krieger, supra note 194, at 1195-98. "[O]ne can conclude that
stereotyped conceptions of minority groups could result from illusory correlations
between two salient variables: minority group membership and negative behav-
ioral events." Id. at 1197.
206. See Armour, supra note 194, at 765-66 (discussing GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNARD GoETz AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988)).
207. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L.
REv. 1739, 1747 (1993) (discussing depictions of Rodney King as animal-like and
subhuman); D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial
Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437, 493 (1993) (recounting current uses of the "old story of
blacks as beasts or animals"); Lawrence Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome:
The Rodney King Trial and the Use of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FoRDHAM
URB. LJ. 571, 576-77 (1993) (discussing the defense tactic of demonizing Rodney
King, the individual, as the dangerous, irrational Big Black Man).
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type of dangerous Black men. Likewise, describing Anita Hill as
delusional conjures the stereotype of the hysterical, irrational fe-
male. 2°8 Thus, the second form of metonymy - from partial signi-
fier to a total stereotype - helps to explain one of the most com-
mon subterranean moves of contemporary bias - it latches onto
secondary characteristics or alleged behavioral attributes as a justi-
fication for a discriminatory decision: "I fired him because he was
lazy, not because he was Black."209 Because humans look for expla-
nations of their own decisions (but do so poorly), they frequently.1 210
attribute their explanation to well-associated "defects" in others.
In doing so, they are not really reporting the actual basis of their
decision, they are replicating the plausible, socially-sanctioned ex-
planations frequently used in such circumstances.211
2. Roadblocks in Developing a Less Biased Advocacy
Despite the pervasiveness of cognitive bias, it certainly seems
appropriate to write in ways that limit and counteract appeals to
unconscious bias - to adopt the equivalent of hate speech codes212
for lawyers' writing - a code that addresses both overt and covert
prejudice. Counterbalanced against the deeply embedded conven-
tion of Machiavellian adversarialness are moral values of social jus-
tice, egalitarianism, and empowering "outsiders." These alternative
values condemn use of racist, misogynist, and other oppressive
stereotypes. These values condemn direct and indirect appeal to
the bias of decision-makers. These values limit the arsenal of the
advocate to those arguments that do not prey on the privilege of
some and the oppression of others. Under this alternative system
of values, lawyers must be acutely aware of the denotation and
connotation of their words. Their self-reflection and self-restraint
would narrow the acceptable range of advocacy so as to avoid un-
principled harm to others. Instead, their advocacy focuses on ex-
posing and transforming linguistic ideologies and symbols of supe-
riority and inferiority.
208. See RAcE-INGJUSTIcE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 185, at 264-65.
209. See Bargh, supra note 200, at 246. In one experiment, John Bargh
found that subjects showed "stereotypic ratings and impressions of the target not
as a function of the target's sex but as afunction of the sex-type of the target's behavior."
Id.
210. See Krieger, supra note 194, at 1213-16.
211. See id.
212. See generally MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRrricAL RACE
THEORY, AsSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
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Although the propriety of appeals to bias in legal writing is not
widely addressed, a lively debate has developed among a few crimi-
nal law commentators about the propriety of efforts to regulate• 215
overzealous advocacy, most of whom seem to favor regulation. At
least one commentator, however, objects to this regulation, argu-
ing that it results in an unavoidable dilution of the duty of zealous
advocacy on behalf of impoverished criminal defendants who are
already "under-represented."21 4 This debate patterns the debate be-
tween First Amendment proponents and anti-discrimination pro-
ponents concerning hate speech.2 5 The problem for practicing
lawyers, however, is even more nuanced than these debates suggest.
How are "overzealous" appeals to bias diagnosed? How are "sub-
tle," implicit appeals to bias to be judged? When, if ever, are such
appeals justified and with what limitations?
As laudatory as anti-bias goals might seem, the ability to articu-
late and enforce a new professional or personal norm is extraordi-
narily difficult in practice. The difficulties of avoiding and/or re-
sponding to appeals to bias are complicated by at least two factors:
(1) the prevailing ethic of Machiavellian adversarialness, 6 particu-
larly the permeability of the current relevancy standard; and (2)
the backlash effect of the color-blind jurisprudence movement that
punishes efforts to counteract oppressive stereotypes as vigorously
as efforts to perpetuate those stereotypes.
Under the prevailing adversarial ethic, lawyers have a great
freedom in selecting stories, themes, contentions, and arguments.
This choice is largely unfettered by legal norms other than the elu-
sive and imprecise norm of relevance and the outer boundaries of
excessive advocacy - little else is unlawful or unethical short of
213. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Balancing Victim's Rights and the Vigorous Advocacy
for the Defendant, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 135, 153 (1989); Gordon Van Kessell, Ad-
versary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 527-31
(1992); and Paul Lowell Haines, Note, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time
forJudicial Interventions, 65 IND. L.J. 445 (1990), for arguments favoring regulation
of appeals to bias.
214. See Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and
Prejudice, 8 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICs 1, 21-44 (1994).
215. SeeJ.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 376-77; Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hol-
lers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 433-36;
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2321-23 (1989); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484, 489-94; ACLU Policy Statement,
Free Speech and Bias on College Campuses (Oct. 13, 1990) (on file with author).
216. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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murder, material misrepresentation, destruction of evidence, brib-
ery of judges, or some other gross subversion of legal process. Al-
though this relevance norm purportedly serves as a barrier to sepa-
rate material facts and law from the immaterial, relevance instead
works to regulate only the grossest appeals to bias, e.g., the prose-
cutor's statement that a local Latino drug courier is the lackey of
Colombian drug lords.1 7
But the relevance barrier is permeable with respect to the cor-
rosive effect of indirect appeals to stereotypes and master stories of
race, gender, class, sexual orientation, and disability. By code
words, connotation, and metaphor, the "skilled" advocate can con-
struct his or her party opponent around the cultural icons of race
and gender: Anita Hill becomes a woman scorned or a woman de-
ranged;2 1 8 Rodney King becomes an enormous black man high on
drugs speeding towards the suburbs.2 9 The lawyers who are sub-
tlest in fashioning their appeals to bias, those who seduce the deci-
sion-maker without raising suspicion, are credited with being the
most skilled. Although these lawyers are ethically constrained in
220their ability to bribe a juror with money, they are presently un-
constrained to bribe one with "laundered" racist fear or misog-221
yny. Their laundering is harder to trace because of the power
and opaqueness of the dominant culture and because of the sub-
consciousness of our own biased cognitive processes.
In response to the dilemma posed by lawyers' appeals to bias,
the American Bar Association is considering, and several jurisdic-
tions have adopted, ethical rules "regulating," but not eliminating,
the practice. Under the ABA proposal,
it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... manifest
217. See, e.g., United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 885 F.2d 1002, 1010 (2d Cir.
1989) (dismissing and remanding because of prosecutor's references to murders
in Colombia); Commonwealth v. Gallego, 542 N.E.2d 323, 325-27 (Mass. App. Ct.
1989) (ordering new trial because of the prosecutor's attempt to sway jury by ref-
erences to public anxiety about Colombian drug trafficking ); Riascos v. Texas,
792 S.W.2d 754, 758-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (concluding that defendant re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to refer-
ences to the defendant as an illegal Colombian alien).
218. See generally RACE-INGJUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER, supra note 185.
219. See Vogelman, supra note 207, at 576-77.
220. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980)
("The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent
his client zealously within the bounds of the law.... ."); id. DR 7-102(8) (stating
that "a lawyer shall not... [k]nowingly engage in ... illegal conduct").
221. See generally Nilson, supra note 214.
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by words or conduct, in the course of representing a cli-
ent, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, na-
tional origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-
economic status. This paragraph does not preclude le-
gitimate advocacy with respect to the foregoing factors.222
Unfortunately, the ABA standard does not eliminate the problem
of appeals to bias, but rather rationalizes it under the rubric of "le-
gitimate advocacy." But what would make such appeals legitimate -
mere relevance? If so, what would make race, gender, class, or
sexual orientation "relevant" to the controversy? How far could
one go even if "legitimate advocacy" were appropriate? Are indi-
rect, subtle appeals through coded words, phrases, and metaphors
more "legitimate"? Is appeal to "bias" against non-target groups -
whites, men, heterosexuals, the L.A. police department - more le-
gitimate than appeals against target groups? 223 As must be clear,
the proposed regulation does little to guide principled choices be-
tween Machiavellianism and non-biased advocacy.
The difficulties in responding to bias are even more complex
because of the backlash movement of color-blind, gender-blind,
sexual orientation-blind, and class-blind jurisprudence. As Jody
Armour documents, many occasions exist where courts condemn
responsible efforts to countermand the pernicious effects of cul-
tural bias.224 He attributes this condemnation to the irrational ap-
plication of color-blind formalism, a formalism which states that
"race has no place in the courtroom., 225 Armour urges the courts,
however, "to distinguish between rationality-enhancing and ration-
ality-subverting uses of racial referents," because all references to
222. ABA House of Delegates, Reports with Recommendations to the House
of Delegates, Nos. 101, 104 (1994); see also, e.g., MASS. CANONS OF ETHics AND
DiscIpuNARYRuLES DR 7-106(C) (8) (1997) (permitting "legitimate advocacy" only
"when race, sex, national origin, disability, age, or sexual orientation, or another
similar factor, is an issue in the proceeding"); N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1984); COLO. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(f)
(1993). The existing ABA standards merely prohibit misrepresentations of fact
and references at trial to matters that are not relevant or not supported by admis-
sible evidence. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 7-102 (A) (5),
DR 7-106(C).
223. See Valerie A. Batts, Modern Racism: New Melody for the Same Old Tunes 1
(1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). "Old fashioned racism in-
volved behaviors, practices and attitudes that overtly defined blacks as less than
whites and thus entitled them to fewer of society's benefits." Id.
224. See Armour, supra note 194, at 734-36.
225. Idat 738.
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disadvantaged groups are not equal 6 Group references histori-
cally have situated current cultural meanings depending on use,
audience, and purpose 7.22  Armour draws on Lawrence's "cultural
meaning" test 28 and Johnson's "racial imagery" test 29 to describe
those usages which perpetuate and exploit current prejudices
against outsider groups.230 He distinguishes these usages, which he
226. Id.
227. See id. at 767.
228. See id. at n.161 (citing Lawrence, supra note 194, at 355-56). "[G]overn-
ment conduct would be 'evaluated to see if it conveys a symbolic message to which
the culture attaches racial significance'." Id.
229. See Armour, supra note 194, at 767-68 n.162 (citingJohnson, supra note
207, at 1799-800). Armour cites Johnson's test as follows:
"Racial imagery" is any word, metaphor, argument, comment, action,
gesture, or intonation that suggests, either explicitly or through com-
monly understood allusion, that
(1) a person's race or ethnicity affect his or her standing as a full, capa-
ble, and decent human being; or
(2) a person's race or ethnicity in any way affects the credibility of that
person's assertions; or
(3) a person's race or ethnicity in any way affects the likelihood that he
or she would choose a particular course of conduct whether criminal or
noncriminal; or
(4) a person's race or ethnicity in any way affects the appropriate sanc-
tions for a crime committed by or against him or her; or
(5) a person's race or ethnicity sets him or her apart from members of
the jury, or makes him or her allied with members of the jury or, more
generally, that a person's race or ethnicity allies him or her with other
persons of the same race or ethnic group or separates him or her from
persons of another race or ethnic group.
Racial imagery will be conclusively presumed from the unnecessary
use of a racially descriptive word.
Where a metaphor or simile uses the words "white," "black,"
"brown," "yellow," or "red"; where any comparisons to animals of any
kind are made; or where characters, real or fictional, who are strongly
identified with a racial or ethnic group are referred to, racial imagery
will be presumed, subject only to rebuttal through proof that the term in
question could not have racial connotations with respect to any witness,
defendants, attorney, or judge involved in the case.
That a speaker disclaims racial intent, either contemporaneously or
at a later date, shall have no bearing upon the determination of whether
his or her remarks or actions constitute a use of racial imagery.
Id.
Contrary to Armour's intended use of Johnson's test, the test, on its face,
would prohibit prophylactic references to race as well as prejudicial ones. Of the
two tests, Lawrence's is probably more nuanced because it resists underinclusive
categories and because it clearly distinguishes between hegemonic and subversive
references to outsider groups.
230. See id. at 766-72.
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would prohibit, 31 and those which attempt to counteract or coun-
termand culturally and cognitively primed systems of negative
232stereotype. He would tolerate the latter as long as they did not
themselves unfairly tip the scales ofjustice. 3
3. Diagnosing and Confronting Appeals to Bias
Unfortunately, the bias/relevancy debates and the color-blind
jurisprudence debates do not illuminate diagnostics for detecting
appeals to bias, let alone the discourse strategies for recalibrating
justice. In the era of modem racism when appeals to racial superi-
ority are in coded words (e.g., affirmative action), in coded stereo-
types (e.g., welfare cheats), and in secondary characteristics in gen-
eral (e.g., "aggressive" Black men), we must find diagnostics and
countermeasures that work.
Thus, in order to avoid unprincipled appeals to bias or to
counteract such appeals by others, the critical lawyer must first de-
velop heuristics for detecting bias, such as: (1) having sympathetic
readers check for bias, (2) using client/role-reversal to change per-
spective, and (3) using target-reversal to change imagery from tar-
get to non-target groups. As an initial diagnostic strategy, lawyers
simply could show legal text to other readers asking them to be
alert for direct and indirect appeals to oppressive bias. This tech-
nique holds promise, especially if one can rely on sympathetic
231. See id; see alsoJody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists,
Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781, 805-09
(1994) (arguing against the admissibility of statistically significant, race-based evi-
dence of reasonable fear in cases involving self-defense).
232. See Armour, supra note 194, at 768 ("[R]eferences that challenge the
factfinders to reexamine and resist their discriminatory responses enhance the
rationality of the fact-finding process.")
233. See id. Armour does not exhaust all the ways in which the scales might
be unfairly tipped in the opposite direction. First, legal decision-makers are not
always from non-target groups; judges and juries are becoming increasingly di-
verse. Given the presence of "outsider" judges and juries, the race, gender, and
sexual orientation of the judge and jury members may have some influences on
which images affect whom. Second, some "positive" images can perform their
own brand of long-term cultural harm despite their short-term benefit for a given
client. Third, there are real limits on our current ability to recalibrate our scales
of justice. One of the most problematic consequences of our inability to detect
our patterns of subconscious bias is that we do not know how "far" we must move
our judgment to counteract them. See Bargh, supra note 200, at 238-39. For ex-
ample, is a suspect female job applicant automatically qualified for a job (using
relevant criteria) simply because we don't know how much we must challenge our
initial negative stereotypic response?
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"outsider" colleagues to do this reading, though this chore imposes
additional, perhaps unfair burdens on outsiders to educate insid-
ers. As a second strategy for diagnosing advocacy images, themes,
and contentions, lawyers might use role reversal to adopt the per-
spective of the other side in the case and to discover if the pro-
posed image or arguments seem unbiased according to an "ouch"
test. Experiencing a radically different, role-reversal response to a
charged phrase should remind lawyers to question the cultural
content of their own discourse. Finally, as a third strategy, the law-
yer could reverse the direction of the proposed advocacy from a
target/outsider to a non-target/insider. For example, if we
doubted the credibility of the image that a "white" Rodney King
was out of control as he was being beaten by four police officers,
the lawyer should eschew such imagery for Rodney King as a Black
man. In general, if we doubt the "truth" of the characterization as
applied to a non-target group member, then we would choose not
to use the image in our advocacy about a target group member un-
less the image is accurate in a vital way.
Even when the advocate has figured out how to navigate the
cognitive, cultural, and regulatory contexts that constrain our dis-
course practices and even where the advocate has refined diagnos-
tic strategies for detecting biased writing, the advocate still must
develop robust discourse strategies for counteracting such bias.
The clearest prophylactic strategy requires bringing the bias to the
attention of the reader. In adopting strategies to counteract bias,
the advocate can neither rely simplistically on appeals to positive
bias, like victimization, nor on the glamour of a valorized client.
Instead, we need to discover more nuanced strategies, strategies
which contextualize the client's character and behavior - warts and
all; strategies which pluralize the monolithic stereotype of the cli-
ent group; and strategies which evoke conscious application of
more egalitarian social values.
Although the color-blind jurisprudence movement may com-
plicate efforts to bring bias to the attention of jurors, there may be
some leeway to confront bias in written advocacy aimed at judges.
Research in social psychology supports the conclusion that bring-
ing bias to the decision-makers' attention helps to ameliorate the
corrosive effect of latent stereotypes. 34 Armour, for example, re-
234. See Armour, supra note 194, at 765 ("As the recent research in social
cognition demonstrates, avoiding stereotype-congruent responses requires con-
scious effort by the decisionmaker.").
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ports experiments proving the benefit of gender-consciousness:
"[W] hen the subjects were reminded of gender, they checked their
stereotype-congruent responses more assiduously than when gen-
der was less salient."235 Researchers on subliminal processes have
similarly concluded that people can counteract the social judgment
effects of their prejudices if they are aware of the potential effects
of those prejudices and if their values or motives so dictate."'
Therefore, the premier discourse strategy to confront negative bias
is a discourse strategy that says, "There's an elephant in the court-
room (or the judicial or legislative chambers); don't let it trample
you." The direct reference to the possibility of bias should, at the
same time, encourage readers to apply justice-enhancing principles
of egalitarianism and social justice. If we appeal to the higher val-
ues which most people hold as an important part of their self-
conception, we might be pleasantly surprised.
Two other strategies hold additional promise in counteracting
bias. First, we should encourage decision-makers to use "fine-
grain" analysis - to pay careful, methodical attention to the many
details of fact, law, and policy before they make their judgments.
As a general proposition, fine-grain analysis is less subject to the• 237
mistakes of bias than holistic, global judgment. Secondly, as part
of the same empathetic strategy implicit with outsider narrative, the
writer should encourage the reader to change places with the out-
sider, to identify as much as possible with the realities of her life
and perspective.2 38 Just as race-reversal and client-reversal can help
235. Id. at 761. Gender was made more salient by increasing the percentage
of women in the decision-group. See id.
236. See Bargh, supra note 200, at 244-45; Thane S. Pittman, Perception With-
out Awareness in the Stream of Behavior: Processes that Produce and Limit Nonconscious
Biasing Effects, in PERCEPTION WITHOUT AWARENESS, supra note 200, at 277, 288.
237. See David A. Schum & Anne W. Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on
Cascaded Inference, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION
MAKING, supra note 184, at 136, 160-67. "[A]s tasks are further decomposed, there
is no chance that crucial evidence items, or factors concerning evidence items,
will be overlooked, discarded, or 'integrated out.'" Id. at 162.
238. SeeWinter, supra note 128, at 2277. Winter comments:
Through the process of projection that makes possible narrative under-
standing, the audience will imagine itself confronted by these experi-
ences; it will be challenged to make sense of them through its own past
experiences in order to understand the story-events as a coherent story-
experience of its own.... The audience 'lives' the story-experience, and
is brought personally to engage in the process of constructing meaning
out of another's experience.
Id.; see also French, supra note 133, at 427, 433.
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in diagnosing bias, they can help in recalibrating bias as well.
4. Avoiding Appeals to "Positive" Bias
After attempting to counteract negative bias, one of the most
difficult remaining judgments facing a critical writer will be
whether to make appeals to "positive" bias which might occasion-
ally help a client/victim to obtain short-term sympathy from a deci-
sion-maker.2 39 Even though blaming the victim is a national pas-
time,2 ° it is also true that "preserving fetal life," "rescuing child
abuse victims," "protecting the little woman," "saving the disadvan-
taged," "accommodating the handicapped," and "safeguarding the
elderly" are all cultural images with some positive salience which
might benefit a ,victim.,,1 41 For example, some elderly citizens are
made to feel vulnerable to crime in general and some are in fact
specially targeted for purse-snatchings, fraud, and other crimes. As
a result, it might be both effective and fair to argue that a landlord
has a special obligation to protect "vulnerable" elderly tenants from
third-party crime.
Despite being "effective," the stereotype which gains partial
advantage in personal injury litigation might come back to bite the
client later on if she attempts to maintain more independent living
arrangements. 24 The temporary victory gained in a victim-baseddisability claim might undermine the empowerment engendered
239. See Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1413-
15 (1993). Minow acknowledges that victim-talk can elicit a favorable response
from others because there is a moral requirement to respond to innocent suffer-
ing. See id. at 1413. Moreover, victimhood has developed a stylish chic which
moves some to claim victimhood for its vicarious pleasures of moral immunity,
solidarity, and emotionalism. See id. at 1413-15.
240. See, e.g., WENDY KAMINER, I'M DYSFUNCTIONAL, You'RE DYSFUNCTIONAL:
THE REcOVERY MOVEMENT AND OTHER SELF-HELP FASHIONS (1992); WILLIAM RYAN,
BLAMING THE VICTIM 3 (1971); Carol Tavris, Beware the Incest-Survivor Machine, N.Y.
TIME, Jan. 3, 1993, § 7 at 1 (book review); John Taylor, Don't Blame Me! The New
Culture of Victimization, NEWYORu., June 3, 1991, at 26, 28.
241. See generally Minow, supra note 239, at 1428-29 ("Victimhood can solicit
expressions and acts of sympathy, relieve responsibility, promote a sense of soli-
darity, and cultivate compassion . . . ."). In the courtroom, sympathy and compas-
sion can translate into judgments and dollars. See generally Mansfield, supra note
129, at 908-13 (arguing that many poverty law clients are both victimized and de-
pendent and that responsible advocacy requires bringing these equitable ele-
ments to the attention of legal decision-makers).
242. See Minow, supra note 239, at 1429. There is a danger of pity, conde-
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by prior involvement in a political movement of people with dis-
abilities. 4 Sympathy turns to pity, support turns to condescension,
claims of victimization turn to cross claims of prior victimization.
44
But the dangers of victim-talk are not all externally imposed - in-
ternally, victim-talk can sap human agency from the victim as well.
"[C]ontemporary victim talk tends to suppress the strengths and
capacities of people who are victims. Victim talk can have a kind of
self-fulling quality, discouraging people who are victimized from
developing their own strengths or working to resist the limitations
they encounter."
2 45
In addition to second-guessing victim-talk, the advocate must
reconsider strategies which would valorize and essentialize the cli-
246ent or client group. Few people are saints. Few groups are sys-
tematically "better" than other groups in human virtue. The client
who reads "too good to be true" probably won't be credible to the
decision-maker. Moreover, not only does valorization belie the full
complexity of the individual client, it inevitably sets her apart, as an
exception, from the despised group of whom she is now a favored
member. Therefore, one discourse strategy, however counterintui-
tive it seems, is to present the client warts and all and, if necessary,
to contextualize those warts.4 7 A second discourse strategy is to
pluralize the otherwise stereotypic image by making it clear that
there is infinite variety within the group: There are Princess Di-
anas and Mother Teresas, and myriad women - white, black, yel-
243. See Lucie E. White, Mobilizations on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making
Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv..L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 547-57 (1987-88).
244. See Minow, supra note 239, at 1430 ("[I]n the victiml[-]talk world, peo-
ple exchange testimonials of pain in a context over who suffered more. Paradoxi-
cally, this blurs distinctions between degrees of harm, leveling all suffering to the
same undifferentiated plane of equal seriousness and triviality.")
245. Id. at 1429.
246. See Mansfield, supra note 129, at 914-18. "One of the major defects with
a [reconstructive] poverty law theory... is its reliance on a romanticized and bib-
lically based generalization of the poor that fails to recognize the normative,
moral, ethical and legal differences in individual client's stories." Id. at 915.
247. See Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1990, 2039-41, 2057-71 (1995) (giving a deeply nuanced account of an "im-
perfect" foster mother's struggle to regain custody and to adopt her three sons);
Williams, supra note 137, at 1195-96 (discussing the need to contextualize the life
of a mother who scalded her child's hands almost to the bone). Two authors have
demonstrated this strategy by contextualizing the character of Sethe in TONI
MORRISON, BELOVED (1987) as a mother who killed her child in a desperate at-
tempt to save the child from the brutalization of the slavemaster. See Marie Ashe,
The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
1017, 1022-29 (1992); Tobin, supra note 170, at 239-42.
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low, and brown, working-class and middle-class, high caste and lowS241
caste, urban and rural, young and old - in between.
The client clearly has some say, in fact arguably the final say, in
deciding whether to appeal to "favorable" bias or to an essential-
ized group portrait. Nonetheless, the judgment to do so has seri-
ous impact on the lawyer's ability to craft a more critical, less biased
discourse. Even when personal stories of victimization are contex-
tualized to address the historical, social, and cultural structures of
public and private oppression, there are risks that a victim-based,
critical discourse might do as much to undermine critical con-
sciousness as to challenge cultural hegemonies. Even when a client
is acknowledged to be one of many, if the many are all essentially
the same, the pluralism of multiple identities and unique personal
history and perspective of the individual are denied. Despite all of
these complexities and contradictions in monitoring, diagnosing,
regulating, and confronting appeals to favorable and unfavorable
bias, the values of zealous advocacy should be tempered, where
possible, by countervailing values of reducing bias and stereotyp-
ing. 
2 49
E. Developing a More Critical, More Feminist Dialogue
Because narrative's power can be subverted so easily and be-
cause not all legal audiences will accept the counter-hegemonic
moves and appeals of outsider stories, critical legal writers might
need to rely on linear "rationality" and more familiar forms of
proof in developing a critical legal discourse. Similarly, because
addressing appeals to bias may be treating the symptom rather
than curing the disease of overzealous advocacy, critical legal writ-
ers may need to challenge the Machiavellian goal of winning at all
costs - of routinely using discourse means which we otherwise
might find abhorrent. Instead of addressing discourse bigotry in
isolation, we should challenge the broader norm of over-strident
248. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REv. 581, 612-15 (1990) (asserting that "woman as victim" is a way to
highlight women's unified existence and deny or minimize individual differences,
thus perpetuating the sexist notion that "to be female is to be a victim").
249. See Hing, supra note 110, at 915-17, 922-38 (arguing that not only must
discourse change, but advocates should direct racially charged disputes between
communities of color to ADR to advance goals of coalition-building and racial
harmony); Brook K. Baker, Teaching Values Through Legal Writing (1992) (con-
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advocacy - a norm, at its extremes, that favors hyperbole, negative
imaging, and savaging one's opponent in pursuit of the Holy Grail
of victory.250
1. Using Critical Rationality and Non-Local, Nonlegal Authority
As a matter of form, legal argumentation ordinarily requires
proof and citation to authority that supports rhetorical proposi-
tions. Nonetheless, conventional legal writing is stultifying in its
near total reliance on statutory language, legal holdings, and legal
authority in general. To gain support for novel, challenging
propositions, critical legal writers must turn to less traditional, but
still familiar, sources of authority. For example, how far can they
contort the dissents of progressive jurists to advance their claims
for reform? Can they rely on international treaties and conven-
tions25' and human rights jurisprudence252 for their legal authority?
Where do they find nonlegal authority - moral, philosophical,
historical, 54 cognitive,255 psychological,256 linguistic,57 sociological,258
250. This list itself is probably hyperbolic since most legal writing texts do
not encourage exaggeration, character assassination, and ad hominem attack.
251. See Lee P. Breckenridge, Protection of Biological and Cultural Diversity:
Emerging Recognition of Local Community Rights in Ecosystems Under International Envi-
ronmental Law, 59 TENN. L. REv. 735, 775-85 (1992) (using international environ-
mental law paradigms to recognize local communities' roles in protecting biologi-
cal diversity and ecosystem viability and human rights paradigms to propose
pluralistic partnerships in the management of environmental resources).
252. See Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist
Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 1 (1995) (of-
fering a remarkably robust discussion of multicultural/feminist perspectives on
human rights discourse). Professor Lewis presents a nuanced discussion of the
cultural clash between the fundamental rights and abolitionist perspective of
many Western human rights and feminist scholars and more culturally sensitive
African feminist perspectives that propose less "legal" intervention and more
community building as a means for addressing widespread female genital mutila-
tion. Id. at 33-45. Especially in her reliance on diverse human rights perspectives
and her insistence on respecting African sources and local knowledge, Professor
Lewis evidences a method of dialogue holding forth great promise for developing
a more critical human rights jurisprudence. See id. at 48-55.
253. See Edward 0. Correia, Moral Reasoning and the Due Process Clause, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 529, 550-65 (1994) (canvassing several moral philosophers to
revitalize the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution).
254. See Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a
Theory, 23 NEW ENG. L. REv. 437, 444-93 (1988) (articulating an extended histori-
cal investigation of spousal support); Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Juy and the
Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for
Change, 74 B.U. L. REv. 777, 783-96 (1994) (investigating the history of ethnically
constituted juries to show that an affirmative peremptory choice is necessary to
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and cultural 59 - for their transformative arguments about what the
law should be? How will the reports of ethnographers and anthro-
pologists help advance complaints of cross-cultural oppression and
differential justice?26° How will empirical social science research
and expert investigations - the scientific method in general
61 -
serve to promote critical claims?
Assuming such untraditional support can be located, mar-
shaled, and transformed to meet the needs of a critical discourse
agenda, are there additional sequences and forms, as well as styles
and voices of "rational" discourse, that advance the possibilities of
social justice and legal change? Will judges accept new Brandeis
briefs that are even more heavily footnoted to nonlegal sources or
will there be increased reliance on expert testimony at trial? Can
the rigors of scientific investigation and the novelties of different
disciplines be reported concisely within the page limits of local
create racially mixed juries).
255. See Winter, supra note 128, at 2230-71 (exploring the interplay between
cognitive and narrative processes and the institutionalization of legal thought and
structure).
256. See Lawrence, supra note 194, at 331-36 (discussing the psychological
irrationality of racism).
257. See generally Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement
of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 761 (studying cognitive process-
ing of bilingual jurors and concluding that it is both impossible to disregard Span-
ish in order to follow the English translation only and irresponsible and undemo-
cratic to exclude bilingual persons from juries).
258. See generally Martha Minow, Learning from Experience: The Impact of Re-
search About Family Support Programs on Public Policy, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 221 (1994)
(exploring public policy-makers' failure to respond to social science findings).
259. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.
J. 769, 777-828 (1992) (identifying, assessing, and appraising "the dominant ideals
of benevolence and discipline in the context of disability advocacy"); Judith Olans
Brown et al., The Mythogenisis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid
Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 457, 467-37 (1996); Williams, supra note 137, at 1163-
68 (investigating media accounts depicting egregious instances of child neglect to
stigmatize welfare recipients and the close connection between those media ac-
counts and contemporaneous legislative debate and legislative enactment aimed
at reducing "welfare abuse and welfare dependency").
260. See generally SCIENCE, MATERIALISM, AND THE STUDY OF CULTURE (Martin
F. Murphy & Maxine L. Margolis eds., 1995) (presenting an anthropological per-
spective that addresses pressing social issues - exploitation, inequality, violence,
hunger, and underdevelopment).
261. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L. REv. 375
(1994) (reporting multiple studies on the imposition of the death penalty). For a
more traditional analysis of the tension between science and law, see Developments
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rules? 212 At present, except in academic scholarship, legal writing
specialists have done little to answer these questions about expand-
ing and revitalizing the most common form of legal reasoning as it
might advance a more critical purpose.
2. Challenging Strident, Adversaial Advocacy
Even with new forms and sources of proof, there are strong
reasons to reject the norm of contentious advocacy. At the risk of
essentializing male and female writers, we must challenge the
whole genre of adversarial "male" writing which seems so strident,
so positional, so hyperbolic, and ultimately so ill-suited to seeking
justice. Is legal writing really mortal combat? Is it a pissing match
- to use yet another male metaphor? Is it a series of legal sound
bites, character assassinations, and legal spin-doctoring, all in the
service of client victory by any means?
Even in its milder, less strident form, traditional adversarial
advocacy uses a cool rationality263 to hide a ferocious competitive
instinct. Under the guise of rationality, "[a] rgument must be sup-
ported by relevant reasons and evidence that are internally consis-
tent, and logical"; in being "rational," the advocate must adhere to
the alleged "canons of rationality."264 However, the six characteris-
tics of effective argumentation - detail, multidimensionality, bal-
ance, subtlety, emphasis, and emotionality - are all enlisted in or-
der to persuade someone of the merits of one's claims and the
deficiencies of opposing claims. 63
Each attorney must attempt to establish his argument as
the stronger, not the truer. To achieve this end, the law-
yer does not necessarily argue purely logically[;] instead,
he argues rhetorically. He must connect his argument to
the concerns, biases, interests, morals, or to whatever ap-
peals to his audience. He strengthens his verified argu-
ment by any means which can be imagined. The lawyer
must strongly connect his argument... to the imagina-
tion of the Uudge or] jury.266
262. See Burns, supra note 182, at 200.
263. See RobertJ. Condlin, "Cases on Both Sides" Patterns of Argument in Legal
Dispute-Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REv. 65, 84 (1985) ("The minimum obligation of
good argument is ordinary rationality.").
264. Id.
265. See id. at 84-89.
266. James E. Murray, Understanding Law as Metaphor, 34J. LEGAL EDUc. 714,
730 (1984).
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Although effective advocacy in pursuit of victory ordinarily re-
quires lawyers to acknowledge and respond to opponents' argu-m n "2 6 7
ments - to evidence balance - they usually do so merely to refute
those claims as insubstantial. Thus, a more critical, nonadversarial
advocacy might tone down excessive rhetoric, decrease competitive
posturing, and instead engage in a more serious legal, moral, and
political dialogue with opponents and legal decision-makers. This
less adversarial advocacy would decrease reliance on a Western
male ideology of verbal combat and victory-at-all-cost for other cul-
tural values, including those offered by non-Western and feminist
perspectives.2
3. Adopting a More Feminist, Dialogic Discourse
In challenging overzealous advocacy, certain feminists have
encouraged the adoption of a more feminist style of discourse -
one that is more dialogic, nuanced, contextual, multidimensional,
and less confrontational. This discourse style acknowledges com-
plexity, multiplicity, and reality of conflicting, but valid, interests
and perspectives. It invites exploration and nuanced discussion in-
stead of bombastic threats and decrees to decide in a particular
way. Although this less adversarial feminist style includes a formal
written discourse, it is not limited to discourse in the courtroom; it
also applies to problem-solving negotiations, alternative dispute
resolution, and mediation processes.169 Nonetheless, a lively dia-
267. See Condlin, supra note 263, at 86-87. "Legitimate consideration on
each side must be acknowledged .... " Id. at 87.
268. See, e.g., Carolyn Jin-Myung Oh, Questioning the Cultural and Gender-
Based Assumptions of the Adversary System: Voices of Asian-American Law Students, 7
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 125, 127-28, 136-39 (1992) (discussing Asian cultural val-
ues of interpersonal harmony, avoidance of direct conflict, and rejection of asser-
tiveness that are at variance with the dominant adversarial ethic of the American
legal system). Oh's research concludes that gender plays a larger role than eth-
nicity in Asian-Americans' aversion to adversarialism, at least in the limited study
she undertook. See id. at 129.
269. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations
on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 44-49 (1985) (break-
ing new ground as the first legal feminist to use Carol Gilligan's analysis of a
feminist ethic of care as the basis for a different kind of lawyering - one with a
greater emphasis on alternative dispute resolution and problem-solving). Some
Canadian feminists generally have eschewed constitutional litigation and dis-
course as a feminist method because it "co-opt[s] feminist argument into abstract
liberal arguments" and because it enhances the authoritarian power of inherently
undemocratic judicial institutions. See Colker, supra note 182, at 152-53 (discuss-
ingJudy Fudge's argument that constitutional discourse is essentially liberal).
[Vol. 23
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logue has developed among feminists about the possibilities of a
less adversarial, more "feminist" style of lawyering and legal dis-
course.
Ruth Colker is the leading proponent of a good faith "dia-
logue" in litigation, a less strident and feminist discourse that re-
spects countervailing interests even while arguing for a particular
antidiscrimination outcome. According to Colker, "[d]ialogue is
deeply feminist"7 ° and hinges on "openness and empathy."
2 7
1
Colker justifies her conviction in a feminist dialogue by reference
to the antifoundation premises of feminist epistemology. 72 "An
approach that denies the possibility of objective truth and insists
upon the need to maintain openness makes it difficult tojustify the
strong, forceful tone of legal argumentation.", 73 Instead, when call-
ing on the empathy of a decision-maker, a feminist should not try
to get that empathy with a sledgehammer; thus, feminists "can af-
ford to speak in a more open voice in the courtroom."274 The
openness Colker calls for specifically in the context of abortion
litigation is urging "pro-choice" advocates to recognize the value of
what she calls "prenatal life" even though the interests of women
individually and collectively outweigh that value. 275 She laments
that none of the feminist briefs in the Webster case "demonstrate [d]
a deep commitment to protecting the values of prenatal life in so-
ciety; none of them recognized that the destruction of prenatal life
to protect women's well-being is an unfortunate rather than a wel-
come outcome."27 6 Colker also urges feminist litigators to rely less
on liberal individualistic (male) legal theory - privacy - and more
on group-based "pro-woman" legal theory, especially equal protec-
tion.277 Thus, the ideological content of an argument is as impor-
tant to Colker as the dialogue she seeks to advance.
Colker's call for a more feminist discourse in abortion cases
prompted a spirited, even caustic rebuttal.278  Sarah E. Bums, in
270. Colker, supra note 182, at 143. "Dialogue refers to conversation in
which we may offer an opinion, but are genuinely interested in learning [or valu-
ing] the perspective of the other person." Id. at 142.
271. Id. at 143.
272. See id. at 155-58.
273. Id. at 155.
274. Id. at 156 (citing Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH.
L. REv. 1574 (1987)).
275. See id. at 158.
276. See Colker, supra note 182, at 187.
277. See id. at 157-59.
278. See generally Bums, supra note 182, at 194 (stating that "feminist litiga-
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opposition to Professor Colker, defines feminist litigation by its
outcomes, not by its methods, and thus she implicitly adopts a
more Machiavellian ethic.279 "Feminist litigation serves the purpose
of resisting these subtle and powerful forces that obscure women's
interests. Our first duty to ourselves as litigators and to our clients
is not to acquiesce." 280 Burns accuses Colker of valorizing passive
femininity rather than active feminism:
In describing feminist litigation, Professor Colker mis-
takes feminine stereotypes - a gentleness that eschews
fights, a valuation of feeling, a concern for others and
their relationships - [for feminism]. However, feminist
litigation is not measured by its form, but rather is gov-
erned by its contribution to the larger feminist enterprise
of transforming established social, economic, political,
and legal power relations that work to the detriment of
281women.
In Burns' view, "[f] eminist litigation is not, and cannot be ... a dia-
logue. Litigation is a conflict between two or more adverse parties
who seek to deploy the state's coercive power in favor of one
party's interests over the interests of the other.
28 2
Naomi Cahn joined the Colker/Burns debate and proposes
that feminist litigation combine an interest in outcome, as urged by
Bums, and an interest in process, as urged by Colker.283 "Feminist
litigation is not defined solely by its focus on the goal of enhancing
women's rights through substantive outcomes. It requires the inte-
gration of substantive goals with the actual process of representa-
tion."284 As a clinician, however, Cahn invokes the traditional clini-
cal emphasis on the (feminist) lawyer's relationship with her client
- so-called client-centeredness - as being constitutive of a feminist
method of representation. "This process includes listening to the
client and reinforcing the client's autonomy .... ,,285 According to
tion is not, and cannot be, as [P] rofessor Colker would have it, a dialogue").
279. See id. at 194-96. Bums points out that Colker's argument is lacking in
concrete, practical rationale because Colker "does not advance any argument as
to how, or whether, briefs that were more 'feminist' according to her prescription
would lead to different or better results." Id. at 202.
280. Id. at 191.
281. Id. at 193.
282. Id. at 194.
283. See Cahn, supra note 163, at 2-3.
284. Id. at 2. The goals of a feminist discourse are not limited to victory in
the traditional sense: "[W]omen may use the legal system for many reasons, in-




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss3/3
1997] CRITICAL DISCOURSE STRATEGIES FOR PRACTICE 559
Cahn, a feminist process occasionally might "use techniques that
are traditionally identified as feminine [displaying values of inti-
macy and connection], but only as a means toward the goal of end-
ing subjugation of women."28 6 Cahn chides Colker for urging good-
faith dialogue, because in doing so, "she overlooks power relation-
ships in litigation and the law and ignores the need for the lawyer
and client to develop a client-centered strategy." 28 7  Cahn also
chides Bums, implicitly, for suggesting that there is no feminist
limit on mortal combat, arguing that "feminist litigation depends





Cahn identifies three useful aspects of feminist litigation: (1)
consciousness raising to name, rename, and overcome oppres-
sion;2 89 (2) using the (female?) lawyer's personal experience of
gender oppression to inform litigation strategy and to increase
one's personal identification with and commitment to the client's290
case; and (3) listening to the client's story empathetically.29'
Paradoxically, Cahn validates Colker's call for dialogue, but pri-
292marily within the context of the lawyer-client relationship. Con-
versely, like Bums, she concludes that dialogue has little role in
litigation: "Without recognizing and overcoming structures of
power, dialogue cannot exist in the litigation context. Unfortu-
nately, Cahn offers no advice or experience on how one would de-
termine if and occasionally when dialogue might successfully con-
front power.
Mary Joe Frug has offered perhaps the most complicated
analysis of a "different" feminist voice in litigation,294 though her
analysis was tragically cut short by her murder."9 5 In developing her
thesis, Frug offers a more sympathetic, more progressive reading of
Carol Gilligan's 1982 book, In a Different Voice, and of an evolving
286. Id. at 4.
287. Id. at 6.
288. Id. at 8.
289. See Cahn, supra note 163, at 8-12.
290. See id. at 12-15.
291. See id. at 15-20.
292. See id. at 17.
293. Id. at 18.
294. Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim "A
Different Voice"?, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 37 (1992).
295. See Paul Langer, Professor's Murder Unsolved, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 16,
1994, at 34. Mary Jo Frug, a law professor at New England School of Law, was
stabbed on April 4, 1991, while on her way to a convenience store. See id. The
murder remains unsolved. See id.
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feminist "strategy of difference."29 ' According to Frug, "a progres-
sive reading would interpret Gilligan's use of sex differences as a
methodology for challenging gender, as an example of how contin-
gently-formed gender differences can be strategically deployed to
unsettle existing inequities between the sexes." 9 Frug expands on
this point later in her piece to suggest the content of a "different,"
more feminist discourse:
Under a progressive reading of Gilligan, sex-linked differ-
ences in discourse function as a clue, as a "logic of identi-
fication" to the location of silenced, marginalized, or sub-
ordinated groups for whom legal assistance may be
helpful. This use of sex-linked differences [in feminist
discourse] is cautious, non-dualistic, partial, contingent,
and sensitive to many constituencies of women.29
Although Frug does not directly address the possibilities or forms
of a more "cautious, non-dualistic, partial, contingent, and sensi-
tive" discourse in practice, the tenor of her analysis clearly sup-
ports the strategic use of a "different voice" - a less adversarial
voice - in certain discourse settings. °
IV. CONCLUSION - BUILDING A CRITICAL DISCOURSE PRACTICE
No matter how clear we are about traditional purposes and
transformative visions in legal writing, the novelties and complexi-
ties of purpose in legal discourse will confound law students as they
enter a new community of practice. The challenge for legal writing
instructors is to create engaging, transformative contexts; to assign
authentic, meaningful tasks; and to explicate the conventions of an
evolving legal discourse to help smooth students' rough entry to
the profession. As our students gradually become more self-
conscious about canonical argumentation strategies, as they be-
come more familiar with the architecture of law, and as they better
understand the special purposes of legal writers and legal readers,
they will accelerate their acculturation into a new community of
practice. If we are good, we will mentor and guide the students
296. See Frug, supra note 294, at 47.
297. Id. at 52.
298. Id. at 64.
299. Id.
300. See id. Frug stresses the importance of this "different voice" at a very
basic level: "[I] am unable to imagine how we can advance the position of women
in law without thinking what the position of women is." Id.
[Vol. 23
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through this transitional acculturation process. If we are better yet,
we will demonstrate, explicate, and empower critical consciousness
and transformative discourse practices that will reinvent the justice
mission of legal writing.
1
In pursuit of these different, but hopefully complementary
goals, legal writing instructors must learn more about the literacy
and discourse traditions our students have inherited and about the
patterns these legacies impose on their initial efforts at legal writ-
ing. Just as important, we must learn to reveal the hidden, the as-
sumed, and the customary both to ourselves and our students.
Even more important, however, legal writing specialists must de-
velop a more transformative vision of social justice and law reform,
"one that specifically challenges the racism, sexism, homophobia,
ableism, and class privilege in ourselves, our students, our profes-
sion, and our society. We cannot be content to turn out lawyers
who uncritically acquiesce to the harmful demands of powerful cli-
ents while ignoring the quiet desperation and violent oppression of
others."30 2 Because writing too often leaves trails of blood in the
303service of injustice, we must enable our students to discover a
critical discourse and its most effective strategies, a discourse which
might expose the realities of existing social wounds and inspire a
new human vision where people are decent to their neighbors and
share their well-being.
Ultimately, no matter what narrative strategy the critical writer
employs, no matter how much she avoids unprincipled appeals to
bias, and no matter how convincingly she marshals a "rational" and
"feminist" presentation of legal and nonlegal authority, a critical
perspective will require constant negotiation with the demands and
purposes of legal discourse within a fluctuating matrix of situ-
ational constraints and opportunities. This critical discourse typi-
cally will face the unyielding momentum of the status quo where
atypical forms of discourse-leverage will be necessary to overcome
existing power dynamics. Nonetheless, that leverage will increase
as outsider narratives become increasingly common, as direct and
subliminal appeals to bias are supplanted with more cogent appeals
301. See Quigley, supra note 8, at 44-46 (arguing the same mission for pov-
erty law clinics).
302. Baker, Implications for Research, Analysis, and Writing Programs, su-
pra note 6, at 91.
303. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609-18
(1986).
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to individual and collective well-being, as advocacy becomes in-
formed with empirical and normative findings from other disci-
plines, and as excessive adversarialness is replaced with more nu-
anced and textured dialogue. Under the impetus of a more critical
discourse, the currents of legal doctrine can be redirected to more
sustainable visions of legal equality and social justice. To create
and sustain this redirection, critical legal writers will have to dis-
cover a whole new set of situation assessment skills and discourse
strategies in order to change the ways of the world. Legal writing's
study of these new, more challenging discourse practices and the
situation variables which support them barely has begun.
It would be tempting to think of a new critical discourse as
consisting of a set of retooled, instrumentalist skills. Under the
sedative of this simplistic formulation, legal writing specialists could
become increasingly sophisticated in theorizing about the contents
and uses of such skills; these easily transferable skills could be
packaged, even sold, through a textbook, and then readily and re-
liably deployed under appropriate circumstances. Unfortunately,
the world of practice that our students face is not nearly so simple.
There are economic realities of having a sustainable practice and
paying off exorbitant student debt. There are real relationships
with actual clients whose values and goals may or may not be con-
sistent with the lawyer's. There are colleagues and support staff
and future clients placing demands on a lawyer's reputation and
causes. And even more to the point, there are legal decision-
makers who can turn off their reading lamps and consign "critical"
texts to the dustbin. In other words, critical discourse is signifi-
cantly structured by the local, changing circumstances of each law-
yer within a larger socio-economic, political, and legal system that
is increasingly mean-spirited and cold-hearted.
Instead of focusing on the replication of transferable instru-
mentalist skills, we need to help our students develop situation
sense and a critical practical reasoning which will assist them in
analyzing the status quo constraints and subversive possibilities in
each discourse project. They have to develop a keen sensibility to
the legacies of literacy they have adopted and to how those legacies
affect both them and their audience. They have to have sophisti-
cated situation assessment skills with which they explore and create
their critical discourse out of the opportunities and constraints of
any given moment. They must fight the fight they might win, but
avoid the one that does more harm than good. They must come to
[Vol. 23
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consider critical discourse as more than a strategy, but a project -
one to be developed with others over a lifetime of practice. Their
victories must be celebrated, consolidated, and shared in the same
way that their defeats must be mourned, circumvented, and tran-
scended. If we succeed in building this vision of a practice, we
might succeed in birthing many instances of a more critical dis-
course.
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